Kurds and Kurdistan in 2025: A Year of Fragile Transitions, Diplomatic Shifts, and Persistent Struggles

As 2025 unfolded, the political landscape for Kurds and Kurdistan remained a mosaic of cautious optimism, entrenched conflicts, and incremental diplomatic maneuvers. Spread across four nation-states—Turkey (Bakur), Syria (Rojava), Iraq (Bashur), and Iran (Rojhilat)—the Kurds, numbering between 30-40 million, navigated a year marked by the dissolution of armed groups, stalled peace processes, electoral gains, and heightened repression. This comprehensive report, drawing on a synthesis of international media, official statements, and regional analyses, chronicles the key political developments throughout 2025. It structures events chronologically where possible, while thematically dividing by region to highlight interconnected dynamics. From the historic disbandment of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey to integration challenges in post-Assad Syria, 2025 represented a crossroads: a potential pivot toward greater autonomy and recognition, tempered by geopolitical pressures from Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad, and Damascus. Yet, underlying issues—such as economic dependencies, human rights abuses, and cross-border tensions—underscored the fragility of these advances. As we reflect from early 2026, the year encapsulated the Kurds' enduring quest for self-determination amid a volatile Middle East.

The Turkish Front: From Armed Struggle to Tentative Dialogue

In Turkey, where Kurds constitute about 20% of the population, 2025 was dominated by the revival and evolution of the Kurdish peace process, a long-stalled initiative aimed at resolving the decades-old conflict with the PKK. The year began with a significant breakthrough in February, when imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan issued a call for disarmament on February 27, urging the group to end its armed struggle and disband. This came amid mounting pressure from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government, which had intensified military operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq and Syria in late 2024. Öcalan's statement, relayed through intermediaries, emphasized a "democratic solution" to the Kurdish issue, signaling a shift from militancy to political negotiation.

The PKK responded decisively in May, holding an extraordinary congress at its Qandil headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan. On May 12, the group announced its formal dissolution, declaring that it had "achieved its historic mission" by raising awareness of Kurdish rights and paving the way for a democratic resolution. This move was symbolic yet substantive, as it aligned with Turkish demands for the PKK to renounce violence. In July, a ceremonial burning of weapons by around 30 PKK commanders and cadres took place in Iraqi Kurdistan, attended by Turkish and Iraqi officials, as well as international observers. This event marked a confidence-building measure, with reports indicating that an undisclosed number of PKK fighters relocated from Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan by October.

The peace process, often referred to as the "Solution Process" or "Imrali Process" (named after Öcalan's island prison), gained momentum through parliamentary involvement. In November, a landmark meeting occurred on November 24, where members of Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) visited Öcalan. During the discussions, Öcalan reiterated the need for democratic reforms, including recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey's constitution and the integration of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) structures into a new Syrian state. He emphasized that "there would be no integration of the SDF into a new Syrian army without democracy," linking the Turkish and Syrian Kurdish issues.

However, the process was not without hurdles. Internal divisions within Erdoğan's coalition, particularly from hardline nationalists in the MHP, slowed progress. Analyses from outlets like Balkan Insight highlighted "conflicting goals," with Kurds demanding Öcalan's release, amnesty for militants, and constitutional amendments, while Ankara prioritized full disarmament and the dissolution of SDF-linked groups in Syria. Despite the PKK's steps, Turkish operations against perceived Kurdish threats continued, including arrests of DEM Party members and journalists, drawing criticism from human rights groups like Genocide Watch, which documented ongoing "anti-Kurdish campaigns" and estimated 40,000 lives lost since 1978.

By December, Öcalan called on Turkey to act as a "facilitator" in negotiations between Syrian Kurds and Damascus, positioning Ankara as a regional peace broker. This development reflected Turkey's dual strategy: advancing domestic peace while exerting influence over Syrian Kurds. Social media echoed Kurdish sentiments, with posts like "Bijî rêber Apo! Bijî Tevgera Azadiya Kurdistan!" (Long live Leader Apo! Long live the Kurdistan Freedom Movement) garnering widespread support. Overall, 2025 represented slow but meaningful gains, with the peace process potentially reshaping Turkey's internal politics and regional role, though full resolution remained elusive.

Syrian Kurdistan: Post-Assad Integration and Turkish Pressures

In Syria, 2025 was a year of precarious transitions for the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), commonly known as Rojava. Following Bashar al-Assad's ouster in late 2024, the new interim government under Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) initiated talks with the SDF in March. On March 10, a landmark agreement was reached, mandating the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state, including a nationwide ceasefire. This deal, overseen by executive committees, aimed for completion by year's end, with the SDF agreeing to withdraw from Aleppo by April 1, though security forces lingered in Kurdish neighborhoods.

The integration process faced immediate challenges. Damascus proposed fragmenting the SDF into three divisions, including a women's brigade, but Kurds countered with demands for cohesive units and constitutional recognition of their rights. Turkey, viewing the SDF as a PKK extension, exerted pressure through Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who during a December 7 visit to Syria urged Kurds not to obstruct stability. Turkish media hinted at Ankara's willingness to support a Damascus-led operation against the SDF if the deal faltered.

Violence erupted sporadically. In December, clashes in Aleppo on December 22 between Syrian forces and SDF fighters killed two civilians, de-escalating into a truce the next day. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met with Damascus officials on December 28, affirming efforts to salvage the agreement. Abdi's November 19 visit to Iraqi Kurdistan, meeting KDP leaders Nechirvan and Masoud Barzani, signaled a thaw in intra-Kurdish relations, bridging ideological divides between the leftist SDF and center-right KDP.

The Syrian National Army (SNA), Turkish-backed, continued violations in areas like Afrin. Despite al-Sharaa's January 29 announcement dissolving armed factions, SNA presence persisted, with reports of operations in Kurdish zones. By April 2025, the interim government began taking control of SNA territories, but integration remained incomplete.

Externally, Israel quietly supported Syrian Kurds, as per analyses, viewing them as allies against Iranian influence. Öcalan's December 30 call for Turkey to broker a deal amplified this, linking Syrian and Turkish processes. Social media captured anxieties, with posts praying for Rojava amid "Turkish-backed terrorists." 2025 thus saw Syrian Kurds balancing integration with autonomy preservation, amid threats of escalation.

Iraqi Kurdistan: Electoral Triumphs and Institutional Challenges

In Iraq, 2025 was a year of political resurgence for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), culminating in the November parliamentary elections. The KRG's stability positioned it as a diplomatic asset, hosting refugees and maintaining relations with Turkey, Iran, the GCC, and the U.S. Voter turnout in Kurdish areas reached 70-78%, the highest in Iraq. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) secured over 1 million votes nationwide, winning 32 seats and topping results in Nineveh. This success reflected cross-sectarian appeal, with Kurds gaining 63-64 seats collectively.

The elections followed rumors of a KDP boycott over disputes with Baghdad on oil, budgets, and Article 140 (disputed territories). Ultimately, participation prevailed, paving the way for reintegration into Iraqi processes. Post-election, KDP delegations met Baghdad leaders on December 24, advocating for oil and gas laws, budget shares, and election reforms.

Economically, oil disputes persisted but saw progress. In December, Iraq and Kurdistan renewed a three-month oil export agreement through March 31, 2026. A technical issue at Khor Mor gas field caused a 1,000 MW power drop across Kurdistan. The KRG advanced financial reforms, establishing a National Bank with 250 billion dinars capital.

Diplomatically, the U.S. opened its largest consulate in Erbil in December, a $800 million facility symbolizing partnership. President Nechirvan Barzani emphasized constitutional implementation as key to resolving disputes with Baghdad, calling for unity among Kurdistani parties. MERI Forum 2025 discussions highlighted the KRG's pragmatic approach, prioritizing federalism and institutionalization.

Iranian attacks, like ballistic missiles targeting an arms dealer in Erbil, underscored vulnerabilities. Despite this, 2025 strengthened the KRG's position, with elections marking a "new chapter" for Iraq and Kurdistan.

Iranian Kurdistan: Repression Amidst Protests and Executions

In Iran, 2025 saw intensified crackdowns on Kurds, with over 800 executions nationwide, disproportionately affecting minorities. Protests linked to 2022 uprisings continued, with strikes in Kurdish cities. In December, 10 Kurds were detained in Sanandaj during demonstrations. The suspicious death of lawyer Khosrow Alikurdi on December 5—officially a heart attack but with signs of foul play—sparked memorials, leading to 31 arrests, including Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi.

Death sentences like Pakhshan Azizi's were upheld, despite torture allegations, while reversals for Verisheh Moradi and others offered rare reprieves. Rights groups decried Iran's "weaponization" of the death penalty to quash dissent. Social media amplified outrage, with calls for secular democracy. The year highlighted Rojhilat's struggles, with no signs of easing repression.

Diaspora and Global Dimensions: Cultural Resilience and International Advocacy

Globally, Kurdish diaspora communities influenced politics, with advocacy for press freedom and rights. In Europe, protests against Turkish operations drew attention, while U.S. support via the Erbil consulate bolstered ties. Cultural narratives, like posts on Kyrgyz Kurds, preserved identity. Israel's "quiet bet" on Syrian Kurds reflected strategic alliances.

Polls on Greater Kurdistan independence engaged thousands, reflecting aspirations. 2025 saw Kurds leveraging global platforms for visibility.

Intra-Kurdish Dynamics: Unity Efforts and Ideological Bridging

Across regions, 2025 fostered intra-Kurdish cooperation. Abdi's meetings with Barzanis bridged SDF-KDP divides. PKK dissolution eased tensions, enabling cross-border dialogue. Barzani's calls for unity emphasized constitutionalism.

Economic and Security Challenges

Oil remained central: KRG-Baghdad disputes resolved temporarily. Security threats from Iran and Turkey persisted. Migration and war impacts highlighted resilience.

Conclusion: 2025 as a Pivotal Year

2025 was transformative yet precarious for Kurds. PKK's end, Syrian integration, Iraqi electoral success, and Iranian repression shaped the landscape. As 2026 dawns, unity and international support will be key to advancing autonomy. The Kurds' story remains one of perseverance, with "Bijî Kurdistan" echoing globally.