Three episodes show how Kurdish leadership has involved religious networks, autonomy negotiations, foreign support and changing approaches to armed struggle: Ubaydallah in 1880, Mustafa Barzani in 1974–1975 and Abdullah Öcalan’s 2025–2026 statements.

Black-and-white studio portrait of Mustafa Barzani seated on a wooden chair in military uniform with shoulder boards and a belt
Mustafa Barzani in a photograph catalogued as 1946, wearing the uniform of a general of the Mahabad Republic. Unknown Mahabad photographer; public-domain image via Wikimedia Commons. Unknown Mahabad photographer · Wikimedia Commons · Public domain.

Ubaydallah: a cross-border movement in 1880

Sheikh Ubaydallah’s movement drew followers from both Ottoman and Iranian Kurdish communities. Sabri Ateş’s archival study describes tens of thousands entering northwestern Iran in the final months of 1880 and briefly occupying several towns. The revolt is often discussed as an early expression of Kurdish nationalism, but Ateş also identifies Sunni–Shiʿi tensions, Ottoman pan-Islamic politics, Armenian national mobilisation and missionary activity as significant parts of its setting. [1] Religious authority and political ambition operated together; reducing the campaign to a single modern national programme obscures these overlapping concerns.

The campaign’s civilian consequences

Anja Pistor-Hatam’s reassessment identifies Mahabad, Maragha and Miyandoab among the towns taken, while Urmia resisted capture. Her account describes the killing of civilians at Miyandoab and devastation inflicted by Iranian forces returning to the frontier. [2] The campaign therefore belongs to the history of political mobilisation and to the history of communities harmed by warfare. Describing Ubaydallah simply as the leader of an anti-Ottoman uprising misses the central 1880 invasion of Qajar Iran and the violence that accompanied it.

Mustafa Barzani: the autonomy dispute of 1974

A CIA memorandum dated 21 March 1974 records Baghdad’s unilateral autonomy decree of 11 March, the failure of negotiations acceptable to Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and preparations for further fighting. An editorial note in the published diplomatic record identifies exclusion of oil-rich Kirkuk and insufficient internal autonomy among Kurdish objections. [3] This was a dispute about territory and the substance of self-government, with military pressure shaping the negotiations. The document also records Barzani seeking increased assistance in Tehran, revealing the international relationships on which his position depended.

His own appeal and the loss of Iranian support

Barzani’s letter of 22 October 1974, reproduced in a later CIA memorandum, asked Henry Kissinger for military equipment, humanitarian relief and support for a political alternative to Baghdad’s autonomy arrangements. His account described displaced civilians and the danger of winter shortages. The accompanying CIA recommendation opposed increasing American assistance and suggested leaving additional support to Iran. [4] A Defense Intelligence Agency appraisal of 6 October 1975 then described the loss of Iranian backing in March, the evacuation of Barzani’s forces from Iraq and the continuing refugee crisis. [5] Read together, these records show the gap between a leader’s requests and his foreign partners’ priorities.

Abdullah Öcalan: the February 2025 call

On 27 February 2025, the DEM Party published Öcalan’s Call for Peace and Democratic Society, signed two days earlier. It called for groups to lay down their arms and for the PKK to convene a congress and dissolve. An additional note conveyed by Sırrı Süreyya Önder linked implementation to recognition of democratic politics and a legal framework. [6] The statement is evidence of Öcalan’s stated political position at that moment. Its arguments about history and society represent his interpretation, and the announcement alone cannot establish the implementation of every part of the proposed process.

The 2026 message and differing political legacies

In the anniversary message published on 27 February 2026, Öcalan advocated moving from armed confrontation towards democratic participation, constitutional citizenship and legal guarantees. [7] These dated texts allow readers to follow changes in his programme without treating all Kurdish organisations as a single institution. Across the three cases, the mechanisms of leadership differ: Ubaydallah mobilised a religious and cross-border constituency, Barzani pursued autonomy while seeking external military support, and Öcalan’s later statements called for a change in political methods. Their legacies must also be assessed through civilian consequences, institutional outcomes and the relationship between declared aims and events.

Sources and further reading

  1. Sabri Ateş, In the Name of the Caliph and the Nation: The Sheikh Ubeidullah Rebellion of 1880–81, Iranian Studies 47:5 (2014), 735–798, DOI 10.1080/00210862.2014.934151; public abstract.
  2. Anja Pistor-Hatam, Sheikh ʿUbaidullah’s Revolt and the Kurdish Invasion of Iran: Attempts at a New Assessment, Journal of Kurdish Studies 4 (2001–2002), 19–30, DOI 10.2143/JKS.4.0.519246; public abstract.
  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXVII, document 243: Colby to Kissinger, 21 March 1974, with editorial notes on the autonomy dispute.
  4. FRUS, XXVII, document 264: Colby to Kissinger, 2 November 1974, reproducing Mustafa Barzani’s letter of 22 October 1974 and the CIA recommendation.
  5. FRUS, XXVII, document 300: Defense Intelligence Agency appraisal, Kurdish Refugee Situation, 6 October 1975; contemporary assessment.
  6. DEM Party, Call for Peace and Democratic Society, published 27 February 2025; Öcalan’s statement signed 25 February and additional note.
  7. DEM Party, Mr. Öcalan’s Message on the First Anniversary of the Peace and Democratic Society Call, 27 February 2026; primary political statement.