Western Kurdistan (Rojava)
- Sherko Sabir
- 20 hours ago
- 32 min read
Table of Contents
Part 1: Defining Western Kurdistan (Rojava)
To understand the unique history of Western Kurdistan—known universally in Kurdish as Rojava (which literally translates to "The West" or "Where the Sun Sets")—we must first understand how its geography fundamentally differs from the rest of the Kurdish homeland.
While Northern Kurdistan (in Turkey) and Southern Kurdistan (in Iraq) are defined by their impenetrable, towering mountain ranges, Rojava is overwhelmingly defined by its flat, fertile plains.
The Geography: The Breadbasket of Syria
Located along the northern border of modern-day Syria, directly adjacent to Turkey, Rojava is not a single, continuous block of territory. Instead, it has historically consisted of three distinct, non-contiguous enclaves, or "cantons," separated by Arab-majority populations. Moving from east to west, these are:
The Jazira Canton (Cizîrê): This is the largest and most populous region, located in Syria’s extreme northeast (Al-Hasakah Governorate), bordering both Turkey and Iraq. Watered by the Tigris River and the Khabur River, it is an incredibly fertile agricultural zone. Before the civil war, this region alone produced over half of Syria's national wheat supply and contained nearly all of its viable oil reserves. Its major cities include Qamishli (Qamişlo), considered the secret capital of Rojava, and Hasakah (Hesekê).
The Kobani Canton (Kobanê): Situated in the north-center of Syria on the eastern banks of the Euphrates River. It is a smaller, historically agricultural enclave that gained massive global fame for its heroic, street-by-street resistance against ISIS in 2014.
The Afrin Canton (Efrîn): Located in the extreme northwest (Aleppo Governorate), this is the only part of Rojava that is mountainous. Afrin is famous across the Middle East for its millions of olive trees, producing high-quality olive oil and soap. It has historically been a deeply peaceful, culturally rich Kurdish enclave. (Note: Since 2018, Afrin has been under the military occupation of Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian rebel factions).
A Tapestry of Demographics
Unlike the deep mountains of the north, the plains of Rojava have always been a crossroads. Because the terrain is easily traversable, the region is highly multi-ethnic and multi-religious.
While Kurds make up the majority in the core cantons, they share the land with significant populations of Arabs, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, and Turkmens. Religiously, the Kurds here are predominantly Sunni Muslim, but there is a notable population of Yezidi Kurds (particularly in Afrin and eastern Jazira), as well as vibrant Christian communities. This deep, historical diversity directly influenced the secular, pluralistic political philosophy ("Democratic Confederalism") that the Kurdish leadership would implement during the 2012 revolution.
The primary language spoken by the Kurds in Rojava is Kurmanji, the exact same dialect spoken just across the border in Northern Kurdistan.
Part 2: Antiquity, Empires, and the Ottoman Borderlands
When studying the early history of Western Kurdistan, the most crucial concept to grasp is that for thousands of years, the border that currently separates Syria from Turkey did not exist. Before the 1920s, Rojava was simply the southern, lowland extension of the greater Kurdish homeland. The history of Rojava is the history of Northern Kurdistan; they were one continuous geographic and cultural space.
Ancient Mesopotamia and the Mitanni Empire
The flat plains of Rojava lie in upper Mesopotamia, one of the cradles of human civilization. The ancestors of the Kurds who lived in these plains were historically tied to the powerful ancient kingdoms that ruled the region.
The Hurrians and Mitanni (c. 1500 BCE – 1300 BCE): The Hurrians, an ancient people who spoke a language with linguistic ties to the deeper roots of modern Kurdish grammar, established the Mitanni Empire. The heartland of the Mitanni was located precisely in the Jazira canton of modern Rojava. Their capital city, Washukanni, is believed by archaeologists to be located near the modern Kurdish city of Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ayn). The Mitanni were master horsemen and chariot builders who rivaled the ancient Egyptians for dominance of the Near East.
The Median and Persian Empires: By the Iron Age, the Iranian-speaking Medes (viewed as the cultural ancestors of the Kurds) and later the Achaemenid Persians absorbed these plains.
The Çiya and the Berrî (Mountains and Plains)
During the Islamic, Ayyubid, and Ottoman eras, the relationship between the Kurds of the mountains and the Kurds of the Syrian plains was defined by seasonal migration and pastoral nomadism.
In Kurdish culture, there is a distinct relationship between the Çiya (the mountains of modern-day Turkey) and the Berrî (the plains of modern-day Syria).
The Seasonal Migration: For centuries, massive Kurdish tribal confederations were nomadic. During the brutal, freezing winters of the northern mountains, the tribes would migrate their massive flocks of sheep down into the warm, flat plains of the Berrî (Rojava). In the summer, when the plains became blisteringly hot, they would migrate back up into the cool pastures of the Çiya.
The Milli Confederation: During the Ottoman Empire (16th to 19th centuries), one of the most powerful groups in this region was the Milli tribal confederation. Led by Kurdish chieftains, this confederation included Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen tribes. They operated essentially as semi-independent lords of the plains around modern-day Raqqa, Urfa, and Hasakah, securing the southern frontier for the Ottoman Sultan while moving freely across what is now the Syrian-Turkish border.
The Twilight of the Ottomans
As the Ottoman Empire began to collapse in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the demographic makeup of Rojava shifted.
Refugees of Empire: As the Ottomans lost territory in the Balkans and the Caucasus, thousands of Muslim refugees (Circassians and Chechens) were resettled by the state in the Syrian plains.
The Armenian Genocide (1915): Tragically, the plains of Rojava (particularly around Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah) became the final destination for the death marches of the Armenian Genocide. Following the end of World War I, thousands of Armenian and Syriac-Assyrian survivors settled permanently in the Jazira region, creating the diverse urban centers that exist today, such as Qamishli, which was founded largely by Assyrian refugees fleeing massacres in Turkey.
Up until the end of World War I, the Kurds of the mountains and the Kurds of the plains were one people, entirely undivided by any political wall or wire. The devastating severing of Rojava from the rest of Kurdistan was about to occur not on a battlefield, but on a map drawn by European diplomats.
Here is the highly detailed expansion of Part 3: The French Mandate and the Railway Border (1920s–1940s).
This is arguably the most heartbreaking and culturally significant chapter in the history of Rojava. It explains exactly how this specific group of Kurds was severed from the rest of their homeland by colonial powers, and how that tragedy unexpectedly turned Syria into the birthplace of the modern Kurdish cultural renaissance.
Part 3: The French Mandate and the Railway Border (1920s–1940s)
The history of Rojava as a distinct political entity began with the stroke of a pen in Europe. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the victorious Allied powers—primarily Britain and France—set about carving up the Middle East to serve their own colonial interests.
The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had already laid the groundwork for dividing the region, but it was the subsequent treaties between France and the newly formed Turkish Republic that physically created Western Kurdistan.
The Ankara Agreement and the Railway Border (1921)
By 1920, the French had established the "Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon." However, French forces in northern Syria were taking heavy casualties from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Turkish nationalist forces. Exhausted by war, the French sought to stabilize their northern frontier.
The Berlin-Baghdad Railway: In 1921, France and Turkey signed the Treaty of Ankara. To establish a clear, easily defensible border, they made a decision of staggering bureaucratic laziness: they simply used the tracks of the unfinished Berlin-Baghdad Railway as the official international boundary for hundreds of miles.
Serxet and Binxet: Overnight, the Kurdish homeland was sliced in half by a literal iron track. The lands north of the railway, in Turkey, became known in Kurdish as the Serxet (Above the Line). The lands south of the railway, in French-controlled Syria, became known as the Binxet (Below the Line).
Families Torn Apart: This arbitrary railway border paid zero attention to the human geography of the region. It brutally bifurcated ancient Kurdish tribal confederations, agricultural lands, and even individual villages. For decades after the border was drawn, a Kurdish farmer in Qamishli (Syria) could literally stand at the railway tracks and wave to his brother living in Nusaybin (Turkey), separated only by a few dozen yards of barbed wire and French and Turkish border guards. The fluid, seasonal migration of the nomadic Kurdish tribes (between the Çiya and the Berrî) was violently criminalized, destroying the region's traditional economy.
The Haven for Exiles (1920s–1930s)
While the border was a tragedy, the French Mandate of Syria inadvertently became a vital sanctuary for Kurdish survival.
Fleeing the Turkish Republic: As the aggressively nationalist Turkish Republic established itself in the 1920s, it banned the Kurdish language and launched brutal military campaigns against Kurdish uprisings (such as the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 and the Ararat rebellion in 1927).
The Mass Exodus: To escape execution by Turkish "Independence Tribunals" and the burning of their villages, tens of thousands of Kurds from Northern Kurdistan fled south across the railway line into the Binxet (Syria).
French "Divide and Rule": The French Mandate authorities largely welcomed these Kurdish refugees. The French strategy in Syria was a classic colonial "divide and rule" policy. Because the French faced massive resistance from the Sunni Arab majority in Damascus and Aleppo, they actively empowered minority groups—Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and Christians—to serve as counterweights to Arab nationalism. The French recruited Kurds into their local colonial militia (the Troupes Spéciales du Levant) and allowed them relative cultural freedom.
The Birth of Xoybûn (1927)
With thousands of exiled Kurdish aristocrats, military officers, and intellectuals now living in the Levant, Syria and Lebanon became the nerve center of modern Kurdish nationalism.
The Founding Congress: In 1927, in the town of Bhamdoun, Lebanon (and subsequently heavily active in Damascus and Rojava), a coalition of exiled Kurdish leaders founded Xoybûn (Khoybun, meaning "Independence" or "Being Oneself").
A Modern Political Movement: Xoybûn was profoundly different from the religiously motivated, tribal rebellions of the past. Led by highly educated, secular figures like the Bedir Khan brothers (Celadet and Kamuran), Ekrem Cemilpaşa, and the influential tribal leader Haco Agha, Xoybûn aimed to create an independent, unified Kurdistan based on modern Western concepts of nationalism and statehood.
The Ararat Uprising: From their safe haven in French Syria, the leaders of Xoybûn organized, funded, and directed the Republic of Ararat uprising against Turkey (1927–1930). When Turkey eventually crushed the rebellion, Xoybûn officially transitioned away from armed struggle, realizing that the Kurds needed a cultural awakening before they could achieve a military victory.
The Hawar Era: The Kurdish Cultural Renaissance (1932–1943)
Realizing that the Kurdish language was facing extinction under Turkish assimilation policies, the exiled intellectuals in Syria launched a massive cultural rescue mission. This era is widely considered the most important literary renaissance in modern Kurdish history.
Celadet Alî Bedirxan and the Latin Alphabet: An aristocratic Kurdish intellectual living in Damascus, Celadet Alî Bedirxan, revolutionized the Kurdish language. He realized that the traditional Arabic script was poorly suited for the Indo-European vowels of the Kurdish language. In 1932, he officially developed and published the Kurdish Latin Alphabet (the Bedirxan script), which remains the standard alphabet used by Kurmanji-speaking Kurds in Rojava and Turkey today.
The Magazine of the Awakening: On May 15, 1932, Bedirxan published the first issue of Hawar (The Call) in Damascus. Hawar was a groundbreaking magazine featuring Kurdish poetry, folklore, grammar lessons, and political essays. It was printed in the new Latin script and smuggled back across the railway line into Turkey.
A Lasting Legacy: Hawar was followed by other highly influential Kurdish publications in Syria, such as Ronahî and Roja Nû. Through these magazines, the exiles in the Binxet standardized the Kurmanji dialect and preserved the cultural identity of the Kurdish people during their darkest hours. To this day, May 15th is celebrated by Kurds worldwide as "Kurdish Language Day" in honor of the first publication of Hawar.
Summary of the French Mandate Era
Event / Entity | Date | Impact on Western Kurdistan (Rojava) |
Treaty of Ankara | 1921 | France and Turkey draw the border along the railway line, physically creating the Binxet (Rojava). |
The Great Refugee Influx | 1920s–30s | Tens of thousands of Kurds flee Turkish massacres, settling in the Jazira region and heavily boosting the Kurdish demographic in Syria. |
Founding of Xoybûn | 1927 | Exiled intellectuals form the first modern, secular Kurdish nationalist organization in the Levant. |
Publication of Hawar | 1932 | Celadet Alî Bedirxan creates the Latin Kurdish alphabet and sparks a massive literary and cultural renaissance from Damascus. |
Part 4: Syrian Independence and Ba'athist Arabization (1946–2000)
When the French Mandate ended and Syria officially gained its independence in 1946, the political landscape for the Kurds shifted drastically. During the Mandate era, the French had allowed relative cultural freedom to minority groups as a counterweight to the Sunni Arab majority. But with independence, the ideology of Arab Nationalism swept through the country.
The new Syrian state was envisioned as an exclusively "Arab" republic. The very existence of a massive, non-Arab indigenous population living on the country’s most fertile agricultural land and borderlands was viewed by Damascus not as a demographic reality, but as a severe national security threat.
The 1962 Hasakah Census: The "Stateless" Kurds
The first major, catastrophic blow to the Kurds of Rojava occurred under the transitional government that followed the collapse of the short-lived United Arab Republic (the political union between Egypt and Syria).
A One-Day Erasure: On October 5, 1962, the Syrian government conducted a highly irregular, one-day special census exclusively in the Al-Hasakah governorate (the Jazira canton).
The Burden of Proof: Kurdish residents were suddenly required to prove that they had lived in Syria prior to 1945. Because many Kurds were historically nomadic, lived in remote rural villages, or simply didn't possess French colonial paperwork, this was an impossible task for tens of thousands of families. Furthermore, the state deliberately sought to classify Kurds who had fled Turkey in the 1920s as "infiltrators."
Overnight Aliens: By the time the sun set, an estimated 120,000 Syrian Kurds (roughly 20% of the Kurdish population at the time) were arbitrarily stripped of their Syrian citizenship.
Ajanib and Maktoumeen: These stateless Kurds were divided into two crushing legal categories. The Ajanib ("foreigners") were issued red identity cards. The Maktoumeen ("unregistered" or "concealed") were the children of Ajanib or those who didn't even make it onto the census; they received no official documentation whatsoever.
The Human Cost: The consequences were devastating. Stateless Kurds could not legally own property, open a business, stay in hotels, travel internationally, or be employed by the state. They could not legally marry Syrian citizens, and they had no access to public healthcare or higher education. They were ghosts in their own homeland, a status that would plague generations of Syrian Kurds until 2011.
The Arab Belt (Hizam Arabi) of 1973
When the Ba'ath Party (which Hafez al-Assad would soon completely dominate) fully entrenched itself in power, it moved beyond legal erasure to physical, demographic engineering. In the 1970s, the state implemented a devastating plan known as the Arab Belt (Hizam Arabi).
The Objective: The geopolitical goal was simple and ruthless: to physically sever the Kurds of Rojava from the Kurds of Northern Kurdistan (Turkey) by creating a massive demographic buffer zone along the border.
The Implementation (1973): The government confiscated a strip of the most fertile agricultural land in the Jazira region, roughly 10 to 15 kilometers deep and 300 kilometers long, hugging the Turkish border.
Demographic Replacement: The state forcibly displaced the Kurdish farmers living in this zone. In their place, the government settled tens of thousands of Arab farmers (many of whom had been displaced by the construction of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River, known as the "Bani Dam" Arabs). The state armed these Arab settlers, built them new model villages, and gave them the stolen Kurdish land.
The Erasure of Identity and Language
Alongside these massive demographic projects, the Ba'athist regime engaged in a relentless campaign of cultural Arabization.
Toponymy: The state systematically changed the ancient Kurdish names of hundreds of villages, towns, and geographical landmarks into Arabic. Kobanê was officially renamed Ayn al-Arab (Spring of the Arabs). Serê Kaniyê became Ras al-Ayn, and Dêrik became Al-Malikiyah.
Language and Culture: The Kurdish language was strictly banned in schools, workplaces, and government offices. Parents were legally prohibited from giving their children Kurdish names. Celebrating Newroz (the Kurdish New Year) was outlawed and heavily policed, often resulting in violent clashes between Kurdish youth and state security forces.
The Great Paradox: Hafez al-Assad and the PKK
One of the most bizarre and defining political dynamics of this era was Hafez al-Assad's relationship with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The Enemy of My Enemy: While Assad brutally crushed Kurdish identity inside Syria, he simultaneously offered safe haven to Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK in Damascus and the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) starting in 1979. Assad used the PKK as a proxy to pressure and destabilize Turkey, primarily over disputes regarding Turkey's damming of the Euphrates River, which restricted water flow into Syria.
Exporting the Struggle: Assad’s intelligence services (the Mukhabarat) actively encouraged young, frustrated Syrian Kurds to cross the border and fight for the PKK against the Turkish army. By allowing Syrian Kurds to bleed for a revolution in Turkey, Assad cleverly vented local Kurdish political frustration outward, keeping them from organizing against his own regime in Damascus. Thousands of Syrian Kurds died fighting in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan during the 1980s and 1990s.
This paradox continued until 1998, when Turkey threatened a full-scale invasion of Syria if Assad did not expel Öcalan. Assad complied, deporting Öcalan (leading to his capture in 1999) and abruptly ending his support for the Kurdish movement, leaving the Syrian Kurds to face the wrath of the Ba'athist security state alone once again.
Summary of the Ba'athist Era
Event / Policy | Date | Impact on Western Kurdistan (Rojava) |
Hasakah Census | 1962 | 120,000 Kurds are arbitrarily stripped of citizenship, becoming stateless Ajanib and Maktoumeen. |
Hafez al-Assad Takes Power | 1970 | Solidifies the Ba'athist Arabization policies and the ruthless Mukhabarat police state. |
The Arab Belt (Hizam Arabi) | 1973 | State confiscates prime Kurdish borderland and settles Arab farmers to physically sever Syrian and Turkish Kurds. |
The PKK Proxy Era | 1979–1998 | Assad harbors Abdullah Öcalan to pressure Turkey, exporting Syrian Kurdish political energy to the Turkish conflict while banning Kurdish rights at home. |
Part 5: The 2004 Qamishli Uprising and Underground Resistance
For decades under the iron grip of the Assad family, political dissent in Syria was effectively a death sentence. The Mukhabarat (state intelligence network) was omnipresent, and the Kurdish population—already stripped of citizenship, land, and language—was kept heavily suppressed. However, the pressure cooker finally exploded in the spring of 2004, triggered by what should have been a standard sporting event.
The Spark: The March 12 Football Match
On March 12, 2004, a local Syrian Premier League football match was scheduled in the city of Qamishli. The local Kurdish team, Al-Jihad, was hosting an Arab team, Al-Fotuwa, from the neighboring Arab-majority city of Deir ez-Zor.
Tensions were already exceptionally high. Just a year prior, the United States had invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein. While the Ba'athist regime in Damascus opposed the US invasion, the Kurds of Syria were quietly celebrating the downfall of the Iraqi dictator who had committed the Anfal genocide against their ethnic kin.
The Provocation: According to numerous eyewitness accounts, thousands of Al-Fotuwa fans arrived in Qamishli on buses armed with sticks, stones, and knives. As they entered the stadium, they deliberately provoked the local Kurdish fans by raising posters of Saddam Hussein and chanting anti-Kurdish slogans.
The Clashes: The Kurdish fans responded by chanting slogans celebrating the Kurdish leaders in Iraq (Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani) and President George W. Bush. Fistfights and stone-throwing quickly erupted in the stands.
The Lethal Response: Syrian state security forces, who were heavily present, intervened. However, rather than simply separating the crowds or firing warning shots, they turned their weapons almost exclusively on the unarmed Kurdish fans, firing live ammunition directly into the stands. Several Kurdish youths and children were killed immediately, and dozens were trampled in the resulting stampede.
The Uprising Spreads Like Wildfire
The events inside the stadium were merely the spark. The next morning, March 13, the funerals for the murdered Kurdish youths transformed into massive, unprecedented political demonstrations.
Marching on the State: Tens of thousands of Kurds poured into the streets of Qamishli. The mourning quickly turned to rage against the Ba'athist state. Protesters attacked government buildings, burned Ba'ath Party offices, and tore down state symbols.
Toppling the Dictator: In a moment of absolute defiance that was previously unthinkable in Syria, Kurdish protesters in the town of Amuda tied ropes around a statue of the late Hafez al-Assad and pulled it to the ground. In Ba'athist Syria, destroying a statue of the "eternal leader" was the ultimate taboo.
A National Revolt: The uprising did not stay contained in the Jazira region. It spread like wildfire across the entire Kurdish belt. Massive protests erupted in the cantons of Kobani and Afrin. Remarkably, the riots even reached the heart of the Syrian capital, with Kurdish residents violently clashing with police in the Zorava and Rukn al-Din neighborhoods of Damascus, as well as the Sheikh Maqsood neighborhood of Aleppo.
The Brutal Crackdown
Bashar al-Assad, who had inherited the presidency just four years prior, realized the regime was facing its most significant internal threat since the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama. He responded with overwhelming military force.
Military Occupation: The Syrian army deployed tanks, helicopters, and heavily armed paratroopers to seal off Qamishli and the surrounding Kurdish towns, effectively placing Rojava under martial law. Power and communication lines were cut.
The Death Toll and Arrests: State forces used shoot-to-kill tactics against demonstrators. Over the course of several days, at least 36 to 40 Kurds were killed, and hundreds were severely wounded. The Mukhabarat launched a sweeping campaign of midnight raids, arresting over 2,000 Kurds.
Torture and Flight: Those arrested were subjected to horrific torture in notorious Syrian prisons like Sednaya. Fearing for their lives, thousands of young Syrian Kurds fled across the border into the newly autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq, establishing refugee camps that still exist today.
The Legacy: The Birth of the Underground
While the Assad regime successfully crushed the 2004 uprising through sheer brutality, the event fundamentally changed the psychology of the Syrian Kurds. The "wall of fear" had been permanently fractured.
The Rise of the PYD: In 2003, just a year before the uprising, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) had been quietly founded as a Syrian offshoot of Abdullah Öcalan’s PKK. During and after the 2004 riots, the PYD capitalized on the immense grassroots anger.
Building the Cadres: Operating entirely underground to avoid Assad's secret police, the PYD and other Kurdish political factions spent the years between 2004 and 2011 building secret networks, organizing youth cells, and establishing a highly disciplined political cadre.
The Dress Rehearsal: In historical retrospect, the 2004 Qamishli uprising was the dress rehearsal for the Rojava Revolution. It proved to the Kurdish political leadership that the masses were ready to mobilize, but it also taught them that they needed a dedicated armed defense force if they were ever going to survive a power vacuum.
Summary of the Qamishli Uprising Era
Event | Date | Historical Significance |
PYD Founded | 2003 | Establishment of the political party that would eventually lead the Rojava revolution. |
The Stadium Massacre | March 12, 2004 | Security forces fire on Kurdish fans during a football match, sparking outrage. |
The Uprising | March 13–18, 2004 | Unprecedented mass protests across Rojava, Damascus, and Aleppo; statues of Assad toppled. |
The Crackdown | Late 2004 | The military occupies Rojava, killing dozens and torturing thousands, driving the Kurdish movement underground. |
Part 6: The Syrian Civil War and the Rojava Revolution (2011–2014)
When the Arab Spring reached Syria in March 2011, protests erupted in the southern city of Daraa and quickly spread across the country. For the Kurds in the north, who had been organizing underground since the 2004 Qamishli uprising, this presented a historic, yet highly dangerous, geopolitical opportunity.
The "Third Way" Strategy
As Syria descended into outright civil war, the political landscape polarized violently between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the Syrian opposition (primarily the Free Syrian Army). The Kurdish leadership, largely guided by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), made a highly calculated strategic decision: they chose the "Third Way."
Distrust of the Regime: The Kurds obviously harbored a deep, historical hatred for the Ba'athist regime that had stripped them of their citizenship, stolen their land, and suppressed their culture for half a century.
Distrust of the Opposition: However, the Kurdish leadership was equally suspicious of the Syrian opposition. The Syrian National Council (based in Istanbul and heavily backed by Turkey) was increasingly dominated by Arab nationalists and Islamist factions. When Kurdish delegates asked the opposition if a post-Assad Syria would recognize Kurdish constitutional rights and autonomy, the opposition flatly refused.
The Strategy: The "Third Way" meant the Kurds would not fight alongside the regime, nor would they formally join the Arab-led rebellion. Instead, they would focus entirely on defending their own regions, avoiding the massive destruction leveling cities like Homs and Aleppo, and quietly building their own political institutions.
The July 19 Revolution (2012)
By the summer of 2012, Bashar al-Assad's military was vastly overstretched. Facing massive rebel offensives in the capital of Damascus and the economic hub of Aleppo, the regime was bleeding troops and resources.
The Tactical Withdrawal: In a pragmatic military move, Assad decided to abandon the Kurdish-majority areas in the north. The regime calculated that the Kurds—busy organizing themselves—would not march on Damascus, and that leaving the north would antagonize Turkey (who was backing the anti-Assad rebels).
The YPG Steps In: Starting on July 19, 2012, in the city of Kobani, the recently formed People's Protection Units (YPG)—the armed wing of the PYD—systematically surrounded Syrian state security compounds.
A Bloodless Takeover: In most cities across Rojava, including Amuda, Afrin, and Derik, the heavily outnumbered Syrian security forces surrendered without a fight, handing over their weapons and retreating to isolated bases in Qamishli and Hasakah. Overnight, state institutions, schools, and checkpoints fell into Kurdish hands. This relatively peaceful transition of power became known as the July 19 Revolution.
The Ideology of Democratic Confederalism
With the Assad regime gone, the PYD began implementing a radical new political system. Drawing directly from the prison writings of PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, they sought to establish "Democratic Confederalism."
This ideology was entirely distinct from traditional Middle Eastern state-building. It completely rejected the idea of forming an independent Kurdish nation-state, viewing the nation-state model itself as inherently oppressive. Instead, it focused on three core pillars:
Grassroots Democracy: Power was decentralized. Neighborhoods formed local communes and councils to manage their own resources, security, and dispute resolution.
Ethnic and Religious Pluralism: Recognizing the diverse demographics of the region, the system mandated the inclusion of Arabs, Syriac-Assyrians, and Turkmen. It established a co-chair system where every administrative position had to be held by two people, often representing different ethnicities.
Radical Women's Liberation: This was the most striking feature of the revolution. The system mandated a minimum 40% (later 50%) quota for women in all councils and institutions. Every co-chair position was required to be held by one man and one woman.
The Rise of the YPJ
To defend this new society, the military structure also reflected this profound ideological shift. In 2013, the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) was officially formed as an all-female independent militia operating alongside the YPG.
For the women of Rojava—many of whom had grown up in deeply conservative, patriarchal tribal structures—the YPJ was not just a military force; it was a vehicle for social emancipation. These female fighters would soon become the global face of the war against radical jihadism.
The Declaration of Autonomy and the Social Contract (2014)
As the civil war raged around them, the Kurdish regions formalized their self-rule. In January 2014, the Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM), a coalition of political parties and civil society groups, officially declared the establishment of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of Rojava.
The Three Cantons: They legally established the three disconnected cantons: Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira.
The Social Contract: They drafted a "Social Contract" (effectively a constitution) that guaranteed freedom of religion, banned the death penalty, outlawed child marriage and polygamy, and officially recognized Kurdish, Arabic, and Syriac as equal languages in schools and public life for the first time in Syrian history.
While the rest of Syria was burning under barrel bombs and the rising tide of radical Islamist factions, Rojava had managed to carve out a fragile, highly progressive island of stability. But this stability would soon face its most terrifying test as a new, black-clad army swept across the desert.
Summary of the Revolution Era
Event / Concept | Date | Historical Significance |
The "Third Way" | 2011–2012 | Kurds refuse to side with Assad or the opposition, focusing solely on regional self-defense. |
July 19 Revolution | July 2012 | Assad's forces withdraw from the north; YPG bloodlessly takes control of major Kurdish cities. |
Democratic Confederalism | 2012–Present | The implementation of Öcalan's ideology: grassroots democracy, pluralism, and women's liberation. |
Formation of the YPJ | 2013 | Establishment of the all-female military wing, breaking deep-seated patriarchal norms. |
Cantons Declared | Jan 2014 | Official declaration of the Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira cantons and the ratification of the Social Contract. |
Part 7: The Siege of Kobani and the Defeat of ISIS (2014–2019)
In the summer of 2014, the newly established, democratic cantons of Rojava faced an apocalyptic threat. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had just swept across the region, capturing the Iraqi city of Mosul and the Syrian city of Raqqa. Flush with hundreds of millions of dollars stolen from central banks and armed to the teeth with advanced American weaponry captured from the fleeing Iraqi Army, ISIS declared a global "Caliphate."
After crushing rival rebel groups and Syrian regime forces in the east, ISIS turned its crosshairs on the isolated Kurdish canton of Kobani.
The Siege of Kobani (September 2014)
In mid-September 2014, ISIS launched a massive, multi-pronged offensive against Kobani. Their goal was to conquer the city, link their territories in Raqqa and Aleppo, and secure complete control of the Syrian-Turkish border.
A Catastrophic Mismatch: The military mismatch was staggering. ISIS deployed convoys of armored Humvees, heavy artillery, and captured tanks. The Kurdish defenders—the YPG and the all-female YPJ—had only light Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and a few homemade armored vehicles.
The Mass Exodus: As ISIS captured hundreds of surrounding Kurdish villages, executing civilians and taking hostages, panic set in. In a matter of days, an estimated 300,000 Kurdish civilians fled their homes, massing at the barbed wire of the Turkish border, pleading to be let in. Turkey eventually opened the border, creating a massive refugee crisis.
Urban Warfare: By early October, ISIS fighters breached the city limits of Kobani. The battle descended into brutal, street-by-street, house-by-house urban warfare. The YPG and YPJ commanders resolved to fight to the last bullet, preparing for a massacre. The world watched the tragedy unfold live; international journalists and frantic Kurdish refugees stood on the hills just across the border in Turkey, filming the black flag of ISIS being raised over Kobani's eastern neighborhoods.
The Turning Point: The Global Coalition Intervenes
As Kobani teetered on the brink of total collapse, global public pressure mounted. The fierce, secular resistance of the Kurdish fighters—particularly the visible leadership of the female YPJ commanders—captured the world's imagination, drawing a stark contrast to the brutal, misogynistic fanaticism of ISIS.
US Airstrikes: In late September and October, the US-led Global Coalition against Daesh (Operation Inherent Resolve) shifted its focus to Kobani. Realizing the Kurds were the only force capable of holding the ground, the US military began coordinating directly with YPG commanders on the ground via smuggled radios and tablets. The US unleashed a devastating barrage of precision airstrikes, obliterating ISIS tanks and troop concentrations just meters away from Kurdish positions.
The Airdrops and the Peshmerga: In a highly controversial move that infuriated Turkey (which viewed the YPG as terrorists), US cargo planes airdropped desperately needed weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies directly to the Kurdish fighters in Kobani. Shortly after, under intense international pressure, Turkey allowed a convoy of heavily armed Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to cross through Turkish territory to reinforce the city.
The Liberation: Bolstered by airpower and fresh supplies, the tide turned. On January 26, 2015, after 112 days of grinding, catastrophic combat that left 80% of the city in absolute ruins, the YPG/YPJ officially declared Kobani liberated. ISIS had suffered its first major, humiliating defeat, losing thousands of its most experienced fighters.
The Formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
The victory in Kobani completely altered the trajectory of the Syrian war. The United States had found its most reliable and effective proxy force on the ground. However, to defeat ISIS permanently, the fight had to move beyond the Kurdish-majority regions and deep into the Arab-majority strongholds of the Caliphate.
An Alliance of Necessity: The Kurdish leadership realized they could not—and should not—occupy Arab cities alone. In October 2015, under the guidance and backing of the US military, the YPG joined forces with local Arab tribes, Syriac Christian militias, and Turkmen fighters to form the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
US Special Forces: The Pentagon deepened its commitment, deploying hundreds of US Special Operations Forces into Rojava to train, equip, and advise the SDF, effectively creating an unspoken security umbrella over northeastern Syria.
The March to Raqqa and the Fall of the Caliphate
Over the next four years, the SDF, backed by Coalition airpower, waged a grueling, systematic campaign to dismantle the Islamic State.
The Liberation of Manbij (2016): The SDF crossed the Euphrates River and liberated the strategic Arab-majority city of Manbij, a crucial transit hub for ISIS foreign fighters.
The Battle of Raqqa (2017): In the summer of 2017, the SDF besieged Raqqa, the de facto capital of the ISIS Caliphate. The urban combat was horrific, heavily reliant on destructive US airstrikes that leveled much of the city. By October 2017, the SDF captured the city, raising the yellow flag of the SDF in the infamous Al-Naim square where ISIS had once conducted public beheadings.
The Final Stand at Baghuz (2019): ISIS was systematically pushed down the Euphrates River valley. In March 2019, the SDF cornered the last remnants of the Caliphate—tens of thousands of die-hard fighters and their families—in a muddy tent city in the village of Baghuz. After weeks of fierce fighting, the SDF declared the total territorial defeat of the ISIS Caliphate.
The Devastating Cost
The victory was historic, but the cost born by the people of Rojava was unimaginable. To rid the world of the ISIS Caliphate, the SDF lost an estimated 11,000 to 12,000 fighters—young Kurdish, Arab, and Syriac men and women. Tens of thousands more were permanently maimed. Furthermore, the victory left the Autonomous Administration responsible for managing the fallout: securing massive, makeshift prisons holding thousands of radicalized ISIS fighters, and sprawling, dangerous detention camps (like Al-Hol) holding tens of thousands of unrepentant ISIS family members, largely abandoned by the international community.
Summary of the Anti-ISIS Campaign
Event | Date | Historical Significance |
ISIS Offensives | Summer 2014 | ISIS captures Mosul and Raqqa, declaring a global Caliphate. |
Siege of Kobani | Sept 2014 – Jan 2015 | The turning point; YPG/YPJ, backed by US airstrikes, break the ISIS siege and shatter their myth of invincibility. |
SDF Formed | October 2015 | YPG allies with Arab and Syriac militias to create a multi-ethnic coalition to march beyond Kurdish territory. |
Liberation of Raqqa | October 2017 | The SDF captures the capital of the ISIS Caliphate after a devastating urban battle. |
Battle of Baghuz | March 2019 | The final territorial defeat of ISIS; over 11,000 SDF fighters lost in the multi-year campaign. |
Part 8: The Autonomous Administration (AANES), Turkish Incursions, and the Fall of Autonomy (2018–2026)
Following the territorial defeat of ISIS, the political landscape of northeastern Syria evolved rapidly. The Kurdish-led forces now controlled roughly one-third of Syria’s total landmass, including massive Arab-majority populations in Raqqa, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor.
The Evolution of AANES
To govern this massive, multi-ethnic territory, the Kurdish leadership restructured their government. In 2018, they officially rebranded the system as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and later the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES).
De-Ethnicizing the Project: The leadership intentionally downplayed the Kurdish name "Rojava" in official documents to make the political project more acceptable to the millions of conservative Arab tribesmen now living under their jurisdiction.
The Balancing Act: AANES functioned as a de facto state. It had its own military (the SDF), its own internal security police (the Asayish), its own curriculum, and collected its own taxes. However, it was completely unrecognized by the international community. It survived entirely through a precarious balancing act between the United States (which kept a small troop presence to fight ISIS remnants) and Russia (which patrolled certain borders).
The Turkish Incursions: Afrin and Peace Spring (2018–2019)
While the US viewed the SDF as heroic allies against ISIS, neighboring Turkey viewed them as an existential threat, classifying the YPG as indistinguishable from the PKK. Unwilling to tolerate a Kurdish-led statelet on its southern border, Turkey launched a series of devastating military invasions.
Operation Olive Branch (2018): In January 2018, the Turkish military, utilizing Syrian rebel proxy militias (the Syrian National Army), invaded the isolated, peaceful Kurdish canton of Afrin. Despite fierce resistance, Afrin fell. The invasion triggered a massive humanitarian disaster. Over 300,000 Kurds were displaced, and human rights organizations thoroughly documented widespread looting, kidnappings, and deliberate demographic engineering (settling displaced Arabs from other parts of Syria into the stolen homes of Afrin's Kurds).
Operation Peace Spring (2019): In October 2019, following a sudden and highly controversial phone call in which US President Donald Trump agreed to pull American troops back from the border, Turkey launched a second massive invasion. Turkish forces captured a 120-kilometer strip of land between the Kurdish cities of Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ayn) and Girê Spî (Tal Abyad), cleaving the Rojava territory in two and displacing another 300,000 civilians.
The Years of Limbo and Drone Warfare (2020–2024)
Following the 2019 ceasefire, AANES entered a brutal period of geopolitical limbo.
Drone Assassinations: Turkey initiated a relentless, years-long campaign of drone strikes, systematically assassinating key SDF commanders, YPJ female leaders, and AANES political figures as they drove down civilian highways.
Weaponizing Water: Turkish-backed forces captured the Alouk water station, repeatedly cutting off the primary drinking water supply to over a million people in the Hasakah region. Furthermore, Turkey severely restricted the flow of the Euphrates River, crippling Rojava's agriculture and electricity generation.
The ISIS Threat: The SDF was left to manage the Al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah (holding 5,000 ISIS fighters) and the sprawling Al-Hol camp (holding tens of thousands of radicalized ISIS family members). In 2022, ISIS launched a massive, bloody prison break attempt in Hasakah, reminding the world that the terror group was severely crippled but not dead.
The Fall of Assad and the End of Autonomy (2024–2026)
The fragile status quo of Rojava was completely shattered by a sudden, seismic shift in the broader Syrian Civil War.
The Fall of Damascus (December 2024): In a stunning turn of events, an offensive spearheaded by the Turkish-backed Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other rebel factions swept across western Syria. In December 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad finally collapsed. Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani) assumed power as the transitional president of Syria in January 2025.
The New Threat to Rojava: The collapse of the Assad regime did not bring relief to the Kurds; it brought an existential crisis. The new transitional government in Damascus was heavily backed by Turkey, meaning Ankara's anti-Kurdish policies now dictated the Syrian state's military objectives.
The 2026 Offensive and the Ceasefire: In January 2026, forces aligned with the new Syrian transitional government launched a coordinated military offensive against the SDF in the northeast. Facing overwhelming force and the shifting priorities of the second Trump administration in the US, the Kurdish leadership was forced to the negotiating table.
The January 2026 Accord (The End of Self-Rule): On January 18 (and consolidated by January 30), 2026, under heavy pressure from the US and regional actors, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and the Syrian interim government signed a historic, paradigm-shifting agreement.
The terms of the 2026 agreement effectively spelled the end of the Rojava democratic experiment as an autonomous entity:
Territorial Concessions: The SDF unconditionally ceded control over the massive Arab-majority governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor to the central Syrian government.
Military Integration: The Kurdish-led SDF agreed to dissolve its independent military command and gradually integrate its fighters into the national Syrian army structures.
State Authority Returns: Syrian central government security forces entered Kurdish bastions like Hasakah to take over border crossings, oil fields, and the administration of ISIS detention centers.
The Current Reality (Early 2026)
Today, Western Kurdistan is transitioning from a decade of utopian, revolutionary autonomy to a reality of conditional integration.
While the new Syrian government promised to restore the citizenship of Kurds stripped of their rights in the 1962 census and respect certain cultural parameters, the atmosphere on the ground is fraught with deep anxiety. The bold experiment of Democratic Confederalism—with its radical women's liberation, decentralized communes, and pluralistic local councils—has been largely absorbed by the centralizing force of the new Syrian state. Yet, the political awakening experienced by the Kurdish people over the last 15 years cannot be undone, leaving a profound and permanent legacy on the social fabric of the Middle East.
Summary of the Final Era
Event | Date | Historical Significance |
Operation Olive Branch | Jan 2018 | Turkey and allied militias invade and occupy the Kurdish canton of Afrin. |
Operation Peace Spring | Oct 2019 | US troops pull back; Turkey occupies the Serê Kaniyê to Tal Abyad strip. |
Fall of Assad Regime | Dec 2024 | Rebel forces capture Damascus; a Turkish-backed interim government takes power. |
Northeastern Offensive | Jan 2026 | The new Syrian government launches a military campaign against the SDF. |
The Integration Accord | Jan 2026 | SDF cedes Raqqa/Deir ez-Zor and agrees to integrate into the Syrian military, effectively ending the autonomous era of Rojava. |
Part 9: Detailed Timeline of Western Kurdistan (Rojava)
The history of Rojava is defined by its dramatic transition from a forgotten, oppressed borderland to the center of a utopian democratic experiment, and finally to its recent, fraught integration into a new Syrian state. Below is the chronological timeline of these key events.
Antiquity to the Mandate Era (c. 1500 BCE – 1946)
c. 1500 – 1300 BCE: The Mitanni Empire (with linguistic ties to modern Kurds) rules upper Mesopotamia; their capital Washukanni is located near modern-day Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ayn).
October 1921: The Treaty of Ankara is signed between France and Turkey. The border is drawn along the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, physically severing Rojava (the Binxet) from Northern Kurdistan (the Serxet).
1920s – 1930s: Tens of thousands of Kurds flee massacres in the new Turkish Republic, settling in the French Mandate of Syria.
1927: Exiled Kurdish intellectuals and tribal leaders found the secular nationalist organization Xoybûn in the Levant.
May 15, 1932: Celadet Alî Bedirxan publishes the first issue of Hawar magazine in Damascus, introducing the Latin Kurdish alphabet and sparking a massive cultural renaissance.
1946: Syria officially gains independence from the French Mandate; the era of Arab Nationalism begins.
The Ba'athist Era and Underground Resistance (1962 – 2011)
October 5, 1962: The Syrian government conducts the Hasakah census. Overnight, 120,000 Kurds are stripped of their citizenship, rendering them stateless.
1973: The state implements the "Arab Belt" (Hizam Arabi), confiscating prime Kurdish agricultural land along the Turkish border and settling Arab farmers to alter the demographics.
1979 – 1998: Hafez al-Assad harbors PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Syria, using Kurdish militants as a proxy against Turkey while strictly suppressing Kurdish identity at home.
2003: The Democratic Union Party (PYD) is secretly founded as a Syrian underground political party aligned with Öcalan's ideology.
March 12, 2004: The Qamishli Uprising. Security forces fire on Kurdish football fans, sparking massive, unprecedented anti-regime riots across Rojava, Damascus, and Aleppo. The uprising is brutally crushed.
The Revolution and the Fight Against ISIS (2012 – 2019)
July 19, 2012: As the Syrian Civil War rages, Assad's forces tactically withdraw from the north. The Kurdish YPG bloodlessly takes control of major cities; the Rojava Revolution begins.
2013: The all-female Women's Protection Units (YPJ) is officially formed.
January 2014: The Kurds officially declare the Autonomous Administration across three cantons (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira), implementing a constitution based on Democratic Confederalism.
September 2014 – January 2015: The Siege of Kobani. Vastly outgunned YPG/YPJ fighters, backed by devastating US airstrikes, break the ISIS siege, marking the terror group's first major defeat.
October 2015: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is formed, uniting Kurdish, Arab, and Syriac militias under US backing.
October 2017: The SDF liberates Raqqa, the de facto capital of the ISIS Caliphate.
January 2018: Turkey launches Operation Olive Branch, invading and occupying the Kurdish canton of Afrin.
March 2019: The SDF captures Baghuz, marking the total territorial defeat of the ISIS Caliphate. Over 11,000 SDF fighters die in the multi-year campaign.
October 2019: Following a US troop pullback, Turkey launches Operation Peace Spring, occupying the strip between Serê Kaniyê and Tal Abyad.
The Fall of Assad and the End of Autonomy (2024 – 2026)
December 2024: Rebel factions, led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, capture Damascus. The Assad regime collapses, and a Turkish-backed interim government takes power under President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Early January 2026: The new Syrian government launches a military offensive against the SDF to force the integration of the northeast into the central state. Arab tribal fighters defect from the SDF en masse.
January 16, 2026: President Sharaa issues Decree No. 13, historically granting citizenship to stateless Kurds, recognizing Kurdish as a national language, and making Newroz a national holiday.
January 30, 2026: The SDF and the Syrian government sign a historic, US-mediated integration agreement. The SDF cedes control of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, hands over border crossings and ISIS prisons, and agrees to gradually integrate its fighters into the Syrian state military, effectively ending the era of autonomous self-rule in Rojava.
Part 10: Q&A: Frequently Asked Questions
The history of Rojava challenges many traditional assumptions about the Middle East. Below are answers to the most common questions regarding the region's demographics, military structure, and complex geopolitical goals.
Q: Why are there so many Arab people in Rojava today?
A: The demographic presence of Arabs in Rojava is the result of three distinct historical factors. First, the southern edges of the Jazira canton naturally merge into the traditional grazing lands of Arab Bedouin tribes. Second, as detailed in the timeline, the Ba'athist regime's 1970s "Arab Belt" policy deliberately moved tens of thousands of Arab farmers to the border to displace Kurds. Third, following the victory over ISIS, the Kurdish-led SDF expanded far beyond traditional Kurdish territory to govern massive Arab-majority cities like Raqqa, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor (territory they have since ceded back to the Syrian state as of January 2026).
Q: What is the YPJ, and why are female fighters so prominent in Rojava?
A: The YPJ (Women's Protection Units) is an all-female militia that fought on the front lines against ISIS and Turkish forces. Their prominence is not just a military necessity; it is the core ideological pillar of the Rojava revolution.
The ideology of Democratic Confederalism places women's liberation at the absolute center of society (a concept they call Jineolojî, or "the science of women"). The political leaders of Rojava believe that a society can only be free if its women are free from patriarchal, tribal, and state oppression. Therefore, women in Rojava are required by law to hold 50% of all administrative positions (the co-chair system) and maintain their own independent armed force to guarantee their political power.
Q: Were the Syrian Kurds trying to create their own independent country?
A: No. While this is a common misconception, the political leadership of Rojava explicitly rejected the concept of an independent nation-state. Following Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological shift in the late 1990s, the PYD argued that creating a new "Kurdish State" would simply replicate the oppressive bureaucracies and borders of the Arab and Turkish states they were fighting against. Instead, their goal was "Democratic Autonomy"—a decentralized system of local communes existing within the recognized borders of Syria.
Q: What is the relationship between the Kurds and the Syrian government today?
A: As of 2026, the relationship has fundamentally transformed. For decades, the Kurds were violently oppressed by the Assad regime. However, in December 2024, the Assad regime collapsed and was replaced by a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Because this new government is heavily backed by Turkey, the SDF faced overwhelming military pressure. In January 2026, the Kurdish leadership signed a comprehensive integration agreement with Damascus. Today, the SDF is dissolving its independent command and integrating into the national Syrian military. In exchange, the central government has finally recognized Kurdish citizenship, language, and cultural rights (via Decree No. 13). The utopian dream of full autonomy has ended, replaced by a tense, heavily monitored integration into the new Syrian republic.
Part 11: References & Further Reading
For readers who wish to dive deeper into the history of Syrian Kurds, the Rojava revolution, and the war against ISIS, the following books provide unparalleled, authoritative insights into the region:
Jordi Tejel, Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society
Why you should read it: This is the foundational academic text on Syrian Kurds before the 2011 uprising. Tejel meticulously documents the French Mandate era, the drawing of the railway border, the Xoybûn movement, and the crushing Ba'athist Arabization policies of the 20th century.
Thomas Schmidinger, Rojava: Revolution, War and the Future of Syria's Kurds
Why you should read it: An excellent, objective overview of how the Rojava system actually functioned on the ground. Schmidinger breaks down the complex ideology of Democratic Confederalism, the structure of the local communes, and the multi-ethnic dynamics of the Jazira canton.
Harriet Allsopp, The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East
Why you should read it: If you want to understand how the Kurds organized themselves under the absolute terror of the Assad regime's secret police, this book is essential. Allsopp details the fractured, underground world of Syrian Kurdish political parties prior to the revolution.
Wladimir van Wilgenburg and Mohammed A. Salih, The Syrian Kurds' Experiment in Self-Rule
Why you should read it: Written by journalists and researchers who spent extensive time on the ground during the war, this book provides a detailed look at the formation of the SDF, the military alliance with the United States, and the complex diplomacy required to balance relations between Washington, Moscow, and Damascus.
Michael M. Gunter, Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War
Why you should read it: A highly accessible historical narrative that explains how the Syrian Kurds went from being the most marginalized, "invisible" minority in the Middle East to the world's most famous shock troops in the war against radical jihadism.
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