The structural dynamics of the Syrian Civil War underwent a profound geographic, demographic, and political transformation in the first quarter of 2018. This shift was catalyzed by "Operation Olive Branch" (Turkish: Zeytin Dalı Harekâtı), a major cross-border military offensive launched by the Republic of Türkiye and its allied proxy militias against the Kurdish-majority Afrin District in northwestern Syria. Commencing on January 20, 2018, and culminating in the capture of Afrin city and the establishment of a long-term occupation on March 24, 2018, the operation fundamentally altered the territorial boundaries of the conflict. The intervention resulted in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) seizing approximately 2,000 square kilometres of territory, encompassing 282 settlements.

To understand the genesis of this conflict, it is essential to analyze the pre-2018 socio-political landscape of the Afrin canton. Prior to the Turkish invasion, Afrin was governed by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and secured militarily by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Because the Syrian regime's forces had largely withdrawn from the region in 2012, Afrin had developed a system of Kurdish self-governance based on "democratic confederalism".

Throughout the early years of the Syrian civil war, Afrin was widely considered one of the safest regions in the country, largely insulated from the catastrophic destruction that leveled cities like Aleppo and Homs. Consequently, it functioned as a vital safe haven, absorbing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from other conflict zones. Demographically, the region was distinctly Kurdish, known historically as "Kurd Dagh" (Mountain of the Kurds), with Kurds constituting approximately 90% of the local population prior to the invasion.

The political administration of Afrin, however, was viewed by Ankara not as a stabilizing local governance model, but as an existential national security threat. The Republic of Türkiye considers the YPG, and its political wing the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be indistinguishable extensions of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization that has waged a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state. From the perspective of Turkish policymakers, the consolidation of Kurdish autonomy along Türkiye's southern border represented the formation of a "terrorist corridor" that could provide strategic depth, logistical support, and ideological inspiration to Kurdish separatists within Türkiye.

1.1 The Strategic Calculus and International Realignments

The decision to launch Operation Olive Branch was not made in a geopolitical vacuum; it was heavily influenced by Turkey's domestic political imperatives and the shifting alliances of the broader Syrian theater. Domestically, the operation served as a mechanism for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to consolidate political power by rallying increasingly nationalistic constituencies.

Furthermore, following the failed coup d'état in July 2016, the Turkish government utilized successive Syrian military interventions to rebuild the credibility, operational capacity, and morale of the Turkish Armed Forces while simultaneously redrawing the balance of power between civilian leadership and the military establishment. In a broader historical context, the intervention exemplifies the expansion of Türkiye's long-standing Kurdish policies—shifting from domestic counterinsurgency to extraterritorial spatial design and demographic control beyond its sovereign borders.

Internationally, the execution of the Afrin offensive required the navigation of a complex web of foreign interests, most notably those of the Russian Federation and the United States. The airspace over northwestern Syria was strictly controlled by Russia. Therefore, the decision to launch the Afrin operation was clearly taken with the explicit, albeit tacit, consent of Moscow. Immediately prior to the commencement of the aerial bombardment, Russia withdrew its military observers from the Afrin region, effectively greenlighting the Turkish advance. This strategic accommodation deepened Türkiye's pivot toward Russia and further entrenched Ankara within the Astana peace process framework, shifting its primary foreign policy objective from ousting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to containing Kurdish territorial expansion.

Conversely, the operation severely strained relations between Türkiye and the United States. Washington had cultivated a deep tactical alliance with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the umbrella organization dominated by the YPG—as its primary ground force in the campaign to defeat the Islamic State (ISIS). The United States viewed the Afrin intervention as a dangerous distraction that drew vital Kurdish fighters away from the eastern Syrian theater, thereby providing ISIS remnants with an opportunity to reconstitute. Despite these strategic disagreements, the international community largely stood by as the operation commenced, setting the stage for one of the most thoroughly documented campaigns of demographic displacement and human rights violations in the modern era.

2. The Legal Pretext and the Casus Belli Controversy

The initiation of cross-border military operations inevitably requires legal justification under international law. In a letter dispatched to the United Nations Security Council on January 22, 2018 (UN Doc. S/2018/53), Türkiye officially framed Operation Olive Branch as an act of self-defense, explicitly invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter. The official Turkish position asserted that the threat of terrorism originating from Syria had not abated, citing an alleged increase in rocket attacks and harassment fire directed at the Turkish provinces of Hatay and Kilis from the Afrin region. The Turkish government maintained that its response was proportionate, measured, and necessary to neutralize terrorists and establish border security.

However, this justification immediately sparked intense debate and widespread skepticism among international legal scholars and human rights observers. The core of the controversy centers on the applicability of Article 51 against a non-state armed group operating within the territory of a sovereign state without that state's consent. Customary international law, heavily influenced by interpretations of the UN Charter and precedents set by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), traditionally demands that an armed attack by a non-state actor possess some level of attribution to the host state to trigger the right to self-defense. In landmark cases such as the Oil Platforms (2003) and the Wall Opinion (2004), the ICJ has maintained state-centered requirements for self-defense. Even in Armed Activities (Congo v. Uganda), the ICJ implied that self-defense against non-state actors, if permissible at all, would only be justified against "large scale attacks".

Türkiye's legal argument was further weakened by the fact that the Syrian government had not invited Turkish forces into its territory, nor had Ankara provided unequivocal evidence that the Syrian state was unwilling or unable to contain the YPG threat. Consequently, numerous legal analysts and international bodies have concluded that the burden of proof required to validate an Article 51 claim was not met, thereby rendering the invasion a violation of the prohibition on the use of force as codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The intervention is widely characterized in international human rights discourse not as a legitimate act of self-defense, but as a preemptive war of territorial acquisition and demographic restructuring.

3. The Combat Phase: Asymmetric Warfare and Violations of International Humanitarian Law

The military execution of Operation Olive Branch was characterized by a massive asymmetry in firepower and technological capability. The Turkish Armed Forces deployed sophisticated aerial assets, heavy artillery, and mechanized infantry, operating in conjunction with tens of thousands of Arab and Turkmen fighters organized under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army (SNA). The SNA, acting as the primary ground infantry, included numerous disparate factions such as the Sultan Murad Division, the Hamza Division, the Levant Front (al-Jabha al-Shamiya), and Ahrar al-Sharqiya. Opposing them were the YPG and affiliated SDF forces, who, despite their experience in the anti-ISIS campaign, lacked the anti-aircraft and heavy anti-armor capabilities necessary to repel a modern NATO-equipped military.

While Turkish official statements asserted that careful precautions were taken to avoid harming civilians and that the operation relied on precision targeting , the reality on the ground, as documented by independent human rights organizations, painted a starkly different picture. The combat phase was marked by widespread violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), specifically concerning the principles of distinction and proportionality.

3.1 Indiscriminate Shelling and Civilian Casualties

During the two-month offensive, densely populated civilian areas, villages, and IDP encampments were subjected to sustained and indiscriminate bombardment. Amnesty International conducted rigorous field investigations and verified that between January 22 and February 21, 2018 alone, Turkish military attacks killed at least 93 civilians, including 24 children, and wounded an additional 313 civilians.

The use of imprecise explosive weapons, such as unguided artillery, in civilian-populated areas constitutes a grave violation of IHL. The effects of this strategy were devastatingly apparent in specific incidents documented by human rights monitors. In the village of Maabatli, a verified artillery strike on January 25, 2018, completely destroyed a civilian home, killing five members of a single family, including three children under the age of 15. Witnesses and digital verification corps confirmed that there were no military headquarters or legitimate military targets in the vicinity, and the closest active frontline was over 40 kilometers away at the border.

Similar atrocities were recorded in the town of Jindires, located just seven kilometers from the Turkish border. Residents described being subjected to hours of continuous, indiscriminate shelling. Reports from local monitors, including the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) and Airwars, documented multiple mass casualty events in Jindires throughout January and March 2018, where fleeing civilians were struck by artillery fire, resulting in dozens of fatalities and the destruction of vital civilian infrastructure, including bakeries. The SNHR's broader statistical analysis of the Syrian conflict during this period highlights the immense toll of the offensive, noting that military operations by all parties across Syria in 2018 resulted in nearly 7,000 civilian deaths, with the Afrin offensive contributing significantly to the regional spike in casualties during the first quarter of the year.

3.2 The Bombing of the Afrin Hospital

A critical threshold of IHL violation is the deliberate or reckless targeting of medical facilities. Hospitals and medical personnel enjoy special protected status under the Geneva Conventions. However, this protection was flagrantly violated during the climax of the Afrin offensive.

On March 16, 2018, as Turkish and SNA forces encircled the city of Afrin, the main hospital in the city was struck by aerial bombardment. Detailed documentation provided by the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (UN COI) in report A/HRC/44/61 provides a chilling account of the attack. At approximately 10:30 PM, consecutive airstrikes impacted the hospital and its immediate vicinity. The initial strike caused a massive explosion that shook the facility, shattered windows and doors, and ignited civilian vehicles parked nearby. As panicked medical staff and civilians sought shelter in the basement and under hospital beds, subsequent strikes hit the surrounding residential homes and caused significant structural damage to the hospital itself.

The bombardment destroyed vital, life-saving medical equipment, rendering the facility entirely inoperable at precisely the moment when civilian casualties from the urban siege were peaking. The targeting of isolated health facilities has been a grim hallmark of the Syrian conflict, often utilized as a strategy to break the resilience of a besieged population and force mass capitulation or displacement. The destruction of the Afrin hospital foreseeably led to massive displacement, as civilians, stripped of all access to emergency medical care, had no choice but to flee the advancing forces.

Documented IHL Violations During Combat Phase	Specific Incidents and Locations	Evidentiary Sources and Verification
Indiscriminate Artillery Shelling	Jindires and Maabatli (January 2018); destruction of civilian homes miles from frontlines.	Amnesty International ; Airwars.
Mass Civilian Casualties	93 civilians (including 24 children) killed in the first 30 days of the offensive alone.	Kurdish Red Crescent; Amnesty International.
Targeting Protected Infrastructure	Bombing of the primary Afrin Hospital on March 16, 2018, destroying life-saving equipment.	UN COI Report A/HRC/44/61 ; SNHR Documentation.

4. The Architecture of Post-Invasion Governance and "Cultivated Chaos"

Following the collapse of YPG defenses, Turkish and SNA forces formally captured the city of Afrin on March 18, 2018. The cessation of major combat operations marked the transition of the region from an active war zone into an occupied territory. The political and security landscape was immediately and fundamentally restructured. The institutions of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration were entirely dissolved and replaced by a complex, highly fractured system of Turkish military oversight and proxy militia rule.

The resulting administrative environment has been aptly characterized by the Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights as a state of "cultivated chaos". Rather than establishing a unified, disciplined security apparatus, direct control over Afrin's sub-districts and individual villages was delegated to dozens of competing SNA factions that had participated in the invasion. These factions—which operated essentially as localized warlords—began fighting amongst themselves for dominance, territory, and economic resources, creating an incredibly dangerous and unpredictable environment for the remaining civilian population.

4.1 Administrative Annexation and the Role of Hatay Governorate

While the SNA factions provided the raw coercive force on the ground, the higher-level administrative and bureaucratic control of Afrin was closely integrated into the Turkish state apparatus. Turkey replaced the previous functioning Syrian institutions with bodies directly linked to, and supervised by, Turkish provincial authorities. Specifically, the region was brought under the administrative umbrella of the adjacent Turkish governorate of Hatay.

The Governor of Hatay, Rahmi Doğan, assumed significant oversight and decision-making power regarding the civic life of Afrin, functioning as the de facto ultimate authority. Under Turkish tutelage, the Afrin City Local Council (ACLC) was established to act as the primary local administrative body. However, the ACLC operates with little genuine autonomy; major decisions, such as the granting of construction permits for new settlements, the issuance of title deeds (Waraqat Takhssiss), and the management of public services, require the authorization of the Hatay governor's office. Furthermore, essential public sectors including health, education, postal services (PTT), and telecommunications were physically and structurally linked directly to Türkiye, laying the groundwork for the deep economic and political dependence of the region on Ankara.

5. Systematic Human Rights Abuses and Crimes Against Humanity

The delegation of security responsibilities to undisciplined SNA factions, operating under the protective umbrella of the Turkish military, established a permanent atmosphere of impunity. Despite Türkiye's obligations as an occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure public order and safety, human rights organizations have documented a systemic failure—and frequently, active complicity—in curbing a horrifying spectrum of abuses.

5.1 Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearances, and Torture

Civilians who remained in Afrin, particularly those of Kurdish descent, live under the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance. The primary pretext for these detentions is the allegation of affiliation with the DAANES, the YPG, or the PKK. However, investigations reveal that these accusations are frequently baseless and serve a dual purpose: the political suppression of the Kurdish demographic and pure economic extortion.

Kidnapping for ransom has emerged as a primary, systematic revenue stream for SNA factions. Armed groups routinely abduct civilians, holding them in clandestine detention centers until their relatives can secure exorbitant sums of money for their release. A comprehensive 2024 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), titled "Everything is by the Power of the Weapon," exhaustively documents this pattern, noting that civilians are often detained simply as punishment for demanding the restitution of their stolen property.

The treatment of detainees within these facilities is marked by severe brutality. Torture is endemic. Former detainees have provided harrowing testimonies of being subjected to severe beatings, electric shocks, and psychological abuse. The HRW investigation, based on interviews with 58 former detainees and survivors, found that Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish intelligence agencies were not merely passive bystanders but were actively involved in carrying out and overseeing these interrogations and abuses alongside the SNA.

In a particularly egregious failure of accountability, the "Military Police"—a force established in 2018 by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and Turkish authorities ostensibly to curb factional abuses and restore order—has itself become deeply implicated in these crimes. For example, one documented case details a civilian tortured in Maarata Prison by Turkish intelligence and the SNA's Military Police; he was beaten until he falsely confessed to building tunnels for the SDF. The physical trauma was so severe that shortly after his release, he suffered a stroke and permanently lost the ability to speak. The SNHR has also documented dozens of individuals who have died directly as a result of torture inflicted in these detention centers.

5.2 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)

Sexual and gender-based violence has been weaponized by the occupying factions to terrorize the local population and enforce social compliance. Reports from the UN COI, Amnesty International, and local monitors highlight SGBV as a documented, persistent pattern of violation in the Afrin region. Women and girls face the threat of abduction, sexual assault, and forced marriages to SNA fighters.

Due to the deep societal stigma surrounding sexual violence and the intense atmosphere of fear, these crimes are heavily underreported. However, structural investigations confirm that SGBV is utilized deliberately to humiliate the Kurdish community and force families to abandon their homes and flee the region. Furthermore, women who engage in public life or activism are specifically targeted. In February 2024, Heba Haj Aref, a prominent women's rights activist, was found dead (hanged) after being blacklisted, threatened, and continuously harassed by SNA armed groups, illustrating the extreme peril faced by female civil society actors under the occupation.

5.3 Economic Exploitation, Looting, and Property Confiscation

The economic infrastructure of Afrin has been systematically dismantled, looted, and expropriated by the occupying forces to enrich the militia commanders and permanently strip the native population of their livelihoods. Afrin is a highly fertile agricultural region, historically dependent on the cultivation of an estimated 14 million olive trees. Since the March 2018 occupation began, human rights groups estimate that roughly three-quarters (75%) of these olive groves have been violently seized by armed groups.

The theft occurs on an industrial scale. Commanders of the SNA rebels, allegedly working in tandem with Turkish officers, have directly seized 140 of the region's 300 olive oil factories, as well as soap and pyrene manufacturing facilities. Armed groups have also engaged in catastrophic environmental degradation for profit, cutting down or burning over 23,500 olive trees and tens of thousands of forest trees for illegal logging and to clear land for settlements.

At the civilian level, widespread looting of homes, shops, and personal property is ubiquitous. Displaced residents who attempt to return to their villages frequently find their homes occupied by SNA fighters or resettled families. Factions such as the Sultan Suleiman Shah division (commanded by Mohammad al Jassem) operate protection rackets, imposing heavy taxes on remaining olive farmers and levying extortionate fines ranging from $2,000 to $5,000 on displaced families seeking to return. Individuals who dare to lodge formal complaints for property compensation or restitution face severe retaliatory acts, including threats, beatings, and abduction.

6. Demographic Engineering and the Policy of Turkification

Perhaps the most profound, calculated, and irreversible consequence of Operation Olive Branch is the deliberate demographic and cultural transformation of the Afrin region. This process fits squarely within the theoretical framework of "Transformative Military Occupation" and state-directed demographic engineering.

Prior to the 2018 invasion, Afrin was overwhelmingly Kurdish. Following the military offensive, which triggered the forced displacement of over 300,000 civilians, the Kurdish proportion of the population plummeted to below 30%. This demographic shift is not merely an unfortunate byproduct of armed conflict; evidence strongly indicates it is a deliberate, state-sponsored strategy designed to alter the ethnic composition of the border region permanently. The strategy relies on two interconnected pillars: the active prevention of Kurdish returns through sustained violence and property confiscation, and the systematic importation and settlement of Arab and Turkmen populations from other parts of Syria.

6.1 State-Sponsored Settlements and Humanitarian Complicity

To solidify this demographic alteration, Turkish authorities, in coordination with the SNA, have overseen the construction of massive, formalized housing settlements. These settlements are intended exclusively to house the families of SNA fighters and Arab/Turkmen refugees and IDPs, structurally preventing the return of the native Kurdish population.

An exhaustive investigation by Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) revealed the mechanisms of this settlement policy. These sprawling housing projects are frequently constructed on land forcibly expropriated from Kurdish owners, or on the ruins of destroyed Kurdish villages. A highly publicized example is the "Kuwait al-Rahma" village, a massive residential community built at the foot of Jabal al-Ahlam (Mountain of Dreams). This settlement was constructed directly on the location of the Kurdish village of Khalta/Khalidiyya, which witnessed fierce fighting during the invasion.

The construction of these settlements exposes a deeply troubling dynamic: the complicity of international humanitarian organizations in facilitating demographic engineering. Funding for projects like Kuwait al-Rahma frequently originates from relief organizations based in Gulf states, including Qatar and Kuwait, as well as Palestinian NGOs (such as Ajnadeen) and the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH).

Operating under the pretext of providing relief for earthquake survivors or housing for IDPs, these organizations channel millions of dollars into construction projects that permanently entrench the displacement of the Kurdish community. The ACLC and Hatay Governor Rahmi Doğan provide the necessary building permits and Waraqat Takhssiss (allocation papers) to legitimize these properties, successfully laundering stolen land through the guise of international humanitarian aid.

6.2 The "Turkification" of Administrative and Cultural Life

Parallel to the physical displacement of the population, the occupying authorities have initiated a comprehensive program of cultural erasure and forced assimilation, widely referred to as "Turkification". The overarching objective is to organically sever the region from its Syrian-Kurdish historical roots and integrate it culturally, economically, and administratively into the Republic of Türkiye.

Linguistic and Educational Repression: The Kurdish language has been systematically marginalized and banned in official administrative domains. Educational curricula have been entirely overhauled; schools now mandate instruction primarily in Turkish and Arabic. Kurdish street names, village names, and public signs have been removed and replaced with Turkish or Arabic equivalents. Furthermore, higher education has been tethered to Turkey, with new medical and vocational schools opened in the region directly affiliated with Gaziantep University.

Economic Annexation: Afrin's economy has been forcibly synchronized with Türkiye's. The collapse of the Syrian pound provided an opportunity for the Syrian Interim Government and Turkish-backed business chambers to push the mandatory adoption of the Turkish Lira for all transactions. This financial integration was facilitated by the establishment of Turkish postal service (PTT) branches throughout the district, rendering the local economy entirely dependent on Turkish monetary policy.

Cultural Erasure and the Destruction of Heritage: The public expression of Kurdish culture is violently suppressed. A tragic manifestation of this occurred in March 2023, when SNA militants from the Jaysh al-Sharqiya faction opened fire on a Kurdish family celebrating the traditional Newroz (Kurdish New Year) festival in Jindires, killing four civilians in cold blood. Additionally, occupying forces have engaged in the deliberate destruction of historical memory, targeting, bulldozing, and looting at least 17 archaeological and religious heritage sites, including Yazidi and Alevi shrines, to erase physical evidence of the region's diverse pre-invasion identity.

7. The Ecosystem of Formal Investigations and Accountability Mechanisms

Despite the inherent dangers of monitoring an active occupation zone, the opacity of the conflict has not prevented rigorous documentation. A consensus has emerged among premier international human rights bodies regarding the systemic and organized nature of the crimes committed in Afrin.

7.1 United Nations and NGO Documentation

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) has acted as the primary international investigative body. In multiple exhaustive reports—including A/HRC/39/65, A/HRC/44/61, and A/HRC/57/86—the COI has detailed severe violations of international law, including war crimes such as pillaging, hostage-taking, torture, and indiscriminate attacks. The COI has explicitly concluded that the SNA forces act with near-total impunity and that Türkiye, exercising effective control as the occupying power, has consistently failed to fulfill its legal obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure public order and protect the civilian population.

Leading international non-governmental organizations have corroborated and expanded upon the UN's findings. Human Rights Watch (HRW), in its seminal 2024 report, interviewed 58 victims and witnesses, concluding unequivocally that Turkish Armed Forces and intelligence personnel are actively involved in carrying out and overseeing abuses alongside their SNA proxies. Amnesty International has published damning evidence regarding the role of Turkish-allied groups in enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and the military occupation of civilian schools.

At the regional level, specialized human rights monitors such as the Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) have mapped the precise mechanisms of property theft and demographic engineering. Their reports utilize a combination of on-the-ground victim testimonies, analysis of forged property deeds, and high-resolution satellite imagery to provide irrefutable proof of the construction of illegal settlements and the destruction of cultural heritage.

7.2 The Pursuit of Universal Jurisdiction

Despite the overwhelming volume of evidence, traditional avenues for international justice remain obstructed. The UN Security Council is functionally paralyzed; geopolitical realities and the repeated use of veto power by the Russian Federation and China have blocked all attempts to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Furthermore, neither Syria nor Türkiye is a signatory to the Rome Statute, severely limiting the ICC's direct jurisdictional reach.

Faced with this institutional blockade, human rights defenders and legal practitioners have increasingly turned to the legal principle of universal jurisdiction. This principle empowers national courts to prosecute individuals for grave international crimes (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) regardless of where the crimes were committed or the nationality of the perpetrators or victims.

In a landmark legal maneuver in January 2024, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), in partnership with STJ and six Syrian survivors, filed a comprehensive criminal complaint with the German Federal Public Prosecutor's Office. Utilizing the robust framework of the German Code of Crimes against International Law (CCAIL), the complaint demands a structural investigation into the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by pro-Turkish militias in Afrin.

This legal filing represents a critical evolution in Syrian accountability efforts. While European courts have previously pursued cases against officials of the Assad regime and operatives of ISIS, the atrocities committed by Turkish-backed Islamist militias against the Kurdish population have historically remained a "blind spot" in international jurisprudence. The ECCHR dossier seeks to rectify this by targeting specific SNA commanders and establishing the legal culpability of the occupying authorities, ensuring that the architecture of impunity in Afrin is finally subjected to legal scrutiny.

8. International Diplomatic Responses and Condemnations

The international community's response to Operation Olive Branch and the ensuing eight-year occupation has been characterized by a volatile mixture of rhetorical condemnation, geopolitical pragmatism, and shifting alliances.

The European Union: The European Union has taken the strongest institutional stance against the intervention. In a landmark resolution adopted in March 2021, the European Parliament formally and unequivocally designated Türkiye's military presence in northern Syria as an "illegal occupation". The resolution harshly condemned the Turkish government's actions, denouncing the illegitimate transfer of Syrian refugees into Afrin as a deliberate effort to reshape the demographic character of the region. The parliament explicitly rejected Ankara's legal justification, stating that "security concerns cannot justify unilateral military action in a foreign country".

France: The French government, led by President Emmanuel Macron, emerged as one of the most vocal critics of the operation from its inception. Macron publicly warned Ankara against using the Afrin offensive as an "excuse to invade Syria". The French President emphasized that while fighting terrorism is a valid goal, it "can never be carried out without rules" and that "all lives have equal worth". In tense direct communications with President Erdoğan, Macron insisted that the 30-day UN ceasefire adopted for Syria also applied to the Afrin operation, a legal interpretation that Türkiye fiercely rejected, leading to significantly strained bilateral relations between the two NATO allies.

The United States: The diplomatic posture of the United States evolved significantly over time, reflecting the tension between its NATO obligations to Türkiye and its tactical partnership with the SDF. During the initial launch of the operation in 2018, the US State Department and the Pentagon offered a somewhat ambivalent response, recognizing Türkiye's "legitimate security concerns" while urging restraint and the avoidance of civilian casualties.

However, as the scale of the atrocities became undeniable, the US stance hardened considerably. In recent years, the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have comprehensively and explicitly documented the arbitrary killings, systemic torture, property confiscation, and demographic shifts engineered by the SNA in Afrin, critically noting the direct involvement and complicity of Turkish intelligence forces in these abuses.

Germany: In Germany, the Afrin offensive triggered an immediate domestic political crisis regarding arms exports. Photographic evidence emerged showing Turkish forces utilizing German-made Leopard 2 main battle tanks during the invasion of the Kurdish enclave. This sparked immense public outrage, given Germany's strict laws regarding the export of military hardware to active conflict zones.

While internal German parliamentary reports technically concluded that the use of the tanks did not violate specific end-user clauses—due to a 2009 military cooperation agreement that removed earlier restrictions on using the tanks against Kurdish groups—the optics of German weaponry being deployed against civilians led to immense political pressure. Consequently, the German government was forced to temporarily suspend lucrative tank modernization contracts with the Turkish defense industry.

Türkiye's Official Position: The Republic of Türkiye has consistently and vehemently rejected all international condemnations, UN reports, and NGO investigations. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs routinely issues press releases dismissing allegations of demographic engineering, war crimes, and human rights abuses as "baseless," "irrelevant," and "far from reality". Ankara maintains an unwavering official narrative that Operation Olive Branch was strictly a counter-terrorism operation conducted in accordance with international law, and that its ongoing presence in Afrin is a necessary stabilizing force that provides humanitarian relief and security for displaced Syrians. Turkish authorities frame the construction of settlements like Kuwait al-Rahma not as demographic engineering, but as benevolent infrastructure development for victims of the conflict.

9. Synthesis of War Crimes, Evidence, and International Action

The table below synthesizes the extensive data gathered by the international monitoring community, categorizing the specific war crimes and IHL violations documented in Afrin, aligned with the primary sources of evidentiary proof and the corresponding international legal and diplomatic actions.

Category of Violation / War Crime	Specific Manifestations in the Afrin Region	Primary Evidentiary Sources and Documentation	International Legal Action & Diplomatic Condemnation
Indiscriminate Attacks & Targeting Civilians	Sustained artillery shelling of densely populated zones (Jindires, Maabatli); Bombing of the Afrin Hospital on March 16, 2018.	UN COI Report (A/HRC/44/61) ; Amnesty International ; SNHR.	EU Parliament resolution condemning unilateral military action ; French government diplomatic rebukes.
Torture, Cruel Treatment, & Murder	Endemic torture in facilities like Maarata Prison; extrajudicial killings; active involvement of SNA "Military Police" and Turkish Intel.	HRW 2024 Report ; US State Dept Human Rights Reports ; SNHR.	ECCHR Criminal Complaint invoking Universal Jurisdiction under the German CCAIL.
Arbitrary Detention & Enforced Disappearance	Widespread kidnapping for ransom; targeting Kurdish civilians for alleged DAANES/YPG ties to extort money.	Amnesty International ; Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights.	Addressed comprehensively in structural investigations submitted to the German Federal Public Prosecutor.
Pillaging & Economic Exploitation	Violent seizure of 75% of the region's olive groves; confiscation of 140 olive oil factories; imposition of extortionate taxes on returnees.	STJ Investigations ; HRW ; UN COI.	Included as a core component of the Universal Jurisdiction complaint regarding the stripping of civilian livelihoods.
Forced Displacement & Demographic Engineering	Expulsion of over 300,000 native Kurds; state-sponsored construction of Arab/Turkmen settlements (e.g., Kuwait al-Rahma) on stolen land.	STJ ; Ceasefire Centre ; SJAC.	EU Parliament explicitly condemns demographic reshaping and illegal occupation ; UN COI highlights failure to allow returns.
Cultural Erasure (Turkification)	Banning the Kurdish language in administration/schools; targeted killings at Newroz celebrations; destruction of 17 historical/religious heritage sites.	ECCHR Dossier ; STJ ; Clingendael Institute.	Widespread condemnation by international NGOs regarding the deliberate erasure of minority ethno-religious identity.

10. Analytical Conclusion

Operation Olive Branch and the subsequent, ongoing occupation of the Afrin district represent a defining paradigm of modern asymmetric warfare, wherein conventional military victory transitions seamlessly into a systematic campaign of demographic and cultural engineering. The exhaustive data compiled by the United Nations, international human rights organizations, and regional monitors conclusively demonstrates that the human rights abuses occurring in Afrin are not the tragic, incidental byproducts of war. Rather, they are the intended outcomes of a structured system of governance designed to permanently alter the socio-political, economic, and ethnic reality of northern Syria.

The strategic utilization of proxy militias—the Syrian National Army—allows the occupying power to maintain a superficial veil of plausible deniability. However, the deep administrative integration of Afrin into the Turkish state apparatus—evidenced by the direct oversight of the Hatay governorate, the imposition of the Turkish Lira, the synchronization of the education system, and the coordinated presence of Turkish intelligence in clandestine detention centers—renders Türkiye legally, politically, and morally responsible as an occupying power under the obligations of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Furthermore, the Afrin case study exposes a critical vulnerability within the global humanitarian ecosystem. The funneling of international relief funds from Gulf states and other NGOs into the construction of housing settlements built on stolen Kurdish land demonstrates how ostensibly benevolent "reconstruction" and "IDP relief" initiatives can be co-opted and weaponized to solidify war crimes, specifically the crime of forced displacement and demographic engineering.

Finally, the geopolitical gridlock at the United Nations Security Council ensures that international accountability for the atrocities committed in Afrin cannot currently proceed through traditional multilateral tribunals like the International Criminal Court. Consequently, the reliance on the principle of universal jurisdiction—championed by organizations like the ECCHR and STJ in European national courts—remains the most viable, and perhaps only, avenue for transitional justice. Until these innovative legal mechanisms yield concrete prosecutorial outcomes and international diplomatic pressure moves beyond rhetorical condemnation, the architecture of impunity in Afrin will persist, cementing the demographic replacement and cultural erasure of one of Syria’s historically distinct and vibrant enclaves.

Table of Contents

Video Overview

1. Introduction and Macro-Geopolitical Context