US decisions have exposed Kurdish partners and civilians to serious risks, but each episode has its own actors and evidence. This account compares the end of covert aid in 1975, the 2019 Syria withdrawal decision and dated statements from the 2026 Iran conflict.

Nechirvan Barzani and Donald Trump standing beside each other before Iraqi and United States flags at Davos
Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and Donald Trump at Davos, 22 January 2020. Official White House photograph by Shealah Craighead, public domain. This is an earlier diplomatic meeting, not a photograph of 2026 Iran-war planning. [8] Shealah Craighead / White House · Wikimedia Commons · Public domain, US government photograph.

1975: aid routed through Iran and then terminated

A 4 June 1975 memorandum from CIA director William Colby to Henry Kissinger confirms that the agency had ended its Kurdish assistance programme. Colby states that US aid had passed through Iran; after the Shah’s agreement with Iraq at Algiers on 6 March, Iranian financial and military support stopped, the Kurdish resistance collapsed and its leaders fled to Iran. [1] This is direct evidence of the dependence of that particular Iraqi Kurdish operation on a state intermediary. It does not describe Saddam Hussein as a US ally or concern Iranian Kurdish parties fighting Tehran.

2019: the border decision and its civilian consequences

The White House’s 6 October 2019 statement, issued after Trump’s call with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced that US forces would no longer be in the immediate area of a planned Turkish operation in northern Syria and would not support or participate in it. [2] This was a specific border withdrawal announcement, not evidence that every American soldier left Syria. On 14 October, the UN Secretary-General reported at least 160,000 civilians displaced by the military developments in the northeast and warned about civilian protection, aid access and possible releases of ISIL-associated detainees. [3] The figure concerns civilians generally, not an independently established ethnic count.

2025: what maximum pressure actually announced

Trump’s NSPM-2, dated 4 February 2025, directed renewed sanctions enforcement, efforts to reduce Iranian oil exports and diplomatic pressure on Iran. [4] It documents the administration’s declared policy and instructions. The memorandum is not, by itself, proof of a Kurdish ground-war agreement, an arms delivery or a promise of Kurdish autonomy. Those are separate claims requiring their own evidence.

March 2026: distinguish public statements from an operational alliance

On 5 March 2026, KRG spokesperson Peshawa Hawramani publicly denied that the Kurdistan Region was part of a plan to arm and send Kurdish opposition parties into Iran. [5] In the recorded 7 March Air Force One press exchange, Trump said he had ruled out Kurdish entry into the war and did not want them hurt or killed. [6] These statements establish the positions expressed on those dates. They neither settle every allegation about covert contacts nor justify the earlier article’s confident assertion that an agreed Kurdish role already existed.

Kurdish institutions and communities face different risks

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and the Syrian Democratic Forces should be identified separately when discussing commitments, borders and military decisions. Nor do they speak for every Kurdish civilian. On 24 March 2026, the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs reported that six Iranian ballistic missiles hit two Peshmerga positions in Soran, killing six personnel and wounding thirty; it called for keeping war away from the region. [7] This is the ministry’s attributed account of a specific attack, not an independently verified total for the conflict.

Historical comparison without a predetermined prediction

The records show why Kurdish readers scrutinise external support: a supply route can close, troops can leave a border position and a public policy can stop short of a security guarantee. They do not establish that all Kurdish organisations share a single strategy or that a future outcome is inevitable. The earlier unsourced claims about operational plans, a blanket public-use ban on Kurdish in Iran, and guaranteed future abandonment have been removed. This is a dated comparison of the cited episodes, not a live account of present deployments.

Sources and further reading

  1. William E. Colby to Henry Kissinger, Termination of the Kurdish Assistance Program, 4 June 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, volume XXVII, document 289; declassified primary memorandum.
  2. White House, Statement from the Press Secretary, 6 October 2019; archived border-force announcement.
  3. UN Secretary-General, Statement attributable to the Spokesman on Syria, 14 October 2019; reported displacement and protection concerns.
  4. White House, National Security Presidential Memorandum NSPM-2, 4 February 2025, sections 1–2; maximum-pressure policy and executive instructions.
  5. Peshawa Hawramani, Statement by the Spokesperson of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 5 March 2026; denial of involvement in an arming and deployment plan.
  6. Donald Trump, Air Force One press gaggle, 7 March 2026, 00:13:11–00:13:49, Roll Call / Factbase transcript; direct remarks on Kurdish entry into the war.
  7. KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Statement, 24 March 2026; ministry’s account of strikes in Soran and reported military casualties.
  8. Shealah Craighead / White House, President Trump at Davos with Nechirvan Barzani, 22 January 2020, Wikimedia Commons, public domain.