A documented account of the coalition’s February formation, differences between Komala factions, March military claims and the consequences reported on both sides of the Iran–Iraq border.

Panoramic view of Koya with buildings, roads, green ground and distant hills beneath a glowing evening sky
Koya in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, photographed by JaGuar0101 on 23 December 2023. This earlier city view provides geographic context for the region hosting Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. JaGuar0101 · Wikimedia Commons · CC0 1.0.

Scope: February–March 2026

The coalition announced in February 2026 brought several Iranian Kurdish opposition parties into a common political framework. Its formation, the views of parties outside it and statements issued during March illuminate different parts of the crisis. This account covers that period and identifies the speaker behind military and casualty claims. Political declarations establish what their authors proposed; interviews and official notices provide dated evidence about subsequent positions and reported events.

The founding declaration of 22 February

The declaration published by the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan lists five members: PAK, PJAK, PDKI, Khabat and Komala Party of Kurdistan. It describes the coalition as the product of discussions through a dialogue centre. Its stated aims include overthrowing the Islamic Republic, Kurdish self-determination, democratic institutions, gender equality and a secular political system in Iran. It also invites cooperation with forces outside the coalition. These are the signatories’ political objectives; the document does not establish that every Kurdish organisation or civilian movement had joined. [1]

Why the name Komala needs care

Several organisations use the Komala name. On 22 February, Komala, the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, explained why it had not signed. It opposed alignment with US and Israeli policy and argued that weapons should ultimately come under elected popular institutions rather than remain with parties. Its statement supported continued dialogue while criticizing the proposed alliance’s political clarity. [2] A different organisation, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, announced that it was joining on 4 March. Its political bureau emphasized unified Peshmerga forces and joint transitional administration as priorities it would pursue within the coalition. [3] A membership list therefore needs both an exact organisation name and a date.

What direct reporting established about military plans

In interviews conducted on 5 March and published by AP on 6 March, PAK officials Khalil Nadiri and Rebaz Sharifi denied an imminent cross-border attack and denied receiving material support from the US or Israel. They expressed conditional willingness to participate if a US ground invasion occurred. [4] The conditional plans described in these interviews cannot establish that a coalition-wide offensive had already begun.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s position

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government is a separate institution from Iranian Kurdish opposition parties. On 5 March, spokesperson Peshawa Hawramani denied that the KRG was part of a plan to arm opposition groups and send them into Iran, and called for protection of the region. [5] Later, its Peshmerga Ministry reported that six Iranian ballistic missiles struck two positions in Soran district on 24 March, killing six Peshmerga and wounding thirty. These figures and the attribution are the ministry’s account of those attacks. [6]

Civilian rights alongside party politics

The Kurdistan Human Rights Network records that Shwaneh Alizadeh was arrested at his family home in Mahabad on 23 March by intelligence forces. Its case account reports absence of a warrant and denial of access to a lawyer and family visits. [7] This individual record documents a reported detention and associated rights concerns; it cannot supply a total for arrests across Kurdish provinces. Keeping named civilian cases, government casualty notices and party military statements distinct helps readers follow how the crisis affected people as well as organisations.

Sources and further reading

  1. PDKI, Announcement Statement of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, 22 February 2026; founding declaration and member list.
  2. Komala, Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, statement explaining non-signature of the alliance document, 22 February 2026.
  3. Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Political Bureau statement on joining the coalition, 4 March 2026.
  4. Stella Martany, Associated Press, 6 March 2026; direct PAK interviews.
  5. Kurdistan Regional Government, spokesperson Peshawa Hawramani, statement of 5 March 2026.
  6. KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, statement of 24 March 2026; reported Soran attacks and casualties.
  7. Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Hiwa case register, Shwaneh Alizadeh; reported arrest on 23 March 2026.