The Kurdish-Iraqi Autonomy Agreement (1970): The Promise Saddam Made and Broke
- Hojîn Rostam
- May 24
- 6 min read
Introduction
On 11 March 1970, the Iraqi Ba’athist government and Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani signed a 15-point Autonomy Agreement that promised to fulfil the Kurdish dream of self-governance within Iraq. Saddam Hussein — then Vice President — personally travelled north to negotiate with Barzani and agreed to every demand. Kurdish would become an official language alongside Arabic. A Kurdish autonomous region would be established across three governorates. Kurds would participate fully in government, including senior positions. Iraq’s constitution would be amended to recognise Iraq as home to ‘two nationalities: Arab and Kurdish.’
It was the most comprehensive recognition of Kurdish rights in Iraqi history. Barzani himself was sceptical — ‘I knew it was a ruse even before I signed the agreement,’ he later recalled. ‘But our people asked me, how can you turn down self-rule for the Kurdish people?’ He was right to be suspicious. Within three years, the Ba’athists had reneged on every major commitment. Kirkuk was excluded from the autonomous region through demographic manipulation. The promised census was never held. And in March 1974, Saddam unilaterally imposed a watered-down version of autonomy that stripped the agreement of all substance — triggering the Second Iraqi-Kurdish War and yet another catastrophic Kurdish defeat.
Contents
What Was the 1970 Autonomy Agreement?
The Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement of 11 March 1970 (also known as the March Accord or the March Manifesto) was a peace agreement between the Iraqi Ba’athist government under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) under Mustafa Barzani. It ended the First Iraqi-Kurdish War (1961–1970) and represented the most comprehensive recognition of Kurdish rights in Iraqi history.
The agreement contained 15 points. Kurdish was recognised as an official language alongside Arabic. A Kurdish autonomous region was to be established across three Kurdish-majority governorates, with disputed areas to be determined by a future census. Kurds were guaranteed representation in government, including senior positions. Iraq’s constitution was amended to recognise the country as home to two nationalities: Arab and Kurdish. The agreement was to be implemented over four years, with full autonomy in place by March 1974.
Key Takeaways
• The 1970 Autonomy Agreement was the most far-reaching recognition of Kurdish rights ever offered by an Iraqi government — recognising Kurdish nationality, language, and the right to self-governance.
• The Ba’athist government never intended to honour the agreement — it was a strategic delay while Saddam Hussein consolidated power, built ties with the Soviet Union, and prepared for a military solution to the Kurdish question.
• Kirkuk was the key battleground — the Ba’athists gerrymandered Kirkuk’s boundaries, launched Arabisation campaigns to alter the city’s demographics, and postponed the census to prevent Kurdish claims to the oil-rich province.
• Barzani’s words echo across Kurdish history: ‘We do not want to be anybody’s pawns. We are an ancient people. We want our autonomy. We want sarbastî — freedom.’
Quick Facts
Agreement: Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement (March Accord / March Manifesto) Date: 11 March 1970 Parties: Iraqi Ba’athist Government (President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, VP Saddam Hussein) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (Mustafa Barzani) Type: Peace accord and autonomy agreement Key Provisions: Kurdish as official language; Kurdish autonomous region across three governorates; Kurdish representation in government; constitutional recognition of Iraq as home to Arab and Kurdish nationalities Implementation Deadline: March 1974 (four-year plan) Kirkuk: Excluded through gerrymandering and Arabisation; census repeatedly postponed Outcome: Ba’athists imposed watered-down autonomy in March 1974; Second Iraqi-Kurdish War erupted Mediator: Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov played a key role in negotiations
Historical Context: Nine Years of War
The First Iraqi-Kurdish War began in 1961 when Mustafa Barzani, who had returned from Soviet exile in 1958, launched an armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy after the new Iraqi revolutionary government failed to deliver on its promises. What began with just 600 armed men grew into a full-scale guerrilla war that lasted nine years and cost thousands of lives. By 1968, the Ba’ath Party had seized power in Baghdad for the second time, and the war had reached a stalemate.
By early 1970, Saddam Hussein concluded that the war against the Kurds was a wasted effort and personally travelled north to negotiate with Barzani. Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov mediated between the parties. On 10 March, Barzani and Saddam finalised the terms. The following day, President al-Bakr publicly announced the agreement. The signed statement concluded with a phrase that would become bitterly ironic: ‘History will bear witness that you Kurds did not have and will never have as sincere a brother and as dependable an ally as the Arab people.’
The Betrayal: How Baghdad Destroyed the Agreement
Within a month of signing, most articles of the agreement were implemented, and Barzani was initially optimistic. But by the end of 1970, it became clear that the Ba’ath Party was playing for time. There was an assassination attempt on Barzani’s son Idris. The census for disputed areas — particularly Kirkuk — was postponed twice. The Ba’athists redrew Kirkuk’s administrative boundaries, annexing Kurdish-majority areas to other provinces and moving Arab settlers into Kurdish neighbourhoods to alter the demographic balance.
By 1973, the accord had effectively collapsed. In March 1974, when the four-year implementation deadline arrived, Saddam unilaterally imposed a watered-down version of autonomy that excluded Kirkuk from the Kurdish region and granted insufficient internal self-governance. Barzani was given until 26 March to accept or reject the terms. He rejected them and the Second Iraqi-Kurdish War began.
Barzani turned to the United States and Iran for support. The Shah of Iran, backed by the Nixon administration and the CIA, provided covert military assistance. But this support was cynically calculated: when Iraq and Iran settled their border disputes in the 1975 Algiers Agreement, the United States and Iran immediately abandoned the Kurds. As the Pike Congressional Report later revealed, Kurdish allies ‘launched an all-out search-and-destroy campaign the day after the agreement was signed.’ Barzani fled into exile and died in the United States in 1979, a broken man.
Timeline of Key Events
1961 — First Iraqi-Kurdish War begins; Barzani leads armed struggle for autonomy.
1968 — Ba’ath Party seizes power in Iraq for the second time.
11 March 1970 — Autonomy Agreement signed; 15-point plan for Kurdish self-governance.
1970–1973 — Ba’athists gerrymander Kirkuk, launch Arabisation, postpone census, attempt assassination of Idris Barzani.
March 1974 — Saddam imposes watered-down autonomy; Barzani rejects it; Second Iraqi-Kurdish War begins.
March 1975 — Algiers Agreement; Iran and the US abandon the Kurds; Kurdish resistance collapses.
1979 — Mustafa Barzani dies in exile in the United States.
Legacy and Significance for Kurdish History
The 1970 Autonomy Agreement is one of the most important and most painful episodes in Kurdish history. It proved that the Iraqi government was capable of recognising Kurdish rights on paper — and equally capable of systematically destroying those rights in practice. Every tactic that would later be used against the Kurds — Arabisation, demographic manipulation, gerrymandering, assassination — was first deployed during the four-year period between the signing and the betrayal of the March Accord.
The agreement also demonstrated, once again, how great powers use the Kurdish cause as a tool. The United States and Iran supported Barzani not because they believed in Kurdish self-determination, but because they wanted to destabilise Iraq. When Iraq and Iran settled their dispute at Algiers in 1975, the Kurds were abandoned overnight. Henry Kissinger’s reported comment — ‘covert action should not be confused with missionary work’ — captures the cynicism of great-power engagement with Kurdish aspirations.
Yet the March Accord also established a principle that would eventually prevail: Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. The 15 points agreed in 1970 were echoed in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which finally established the Kurdistan Regional Government as a constitutionally mandated autonomous entity. It took 35 years — years that included the Anfal genocide, the Halabja chemical attack, the 1991 uprising, and the 2003 invasion — but the autonomy that Barzani signed for in 1970 was ultimately realised, not through trust in Baghdad, but through Kurdish sacrifice and persistence.
Frequently Asked Questions
What was the 1970 Kurdish-Iraqi Autonomy Agreement?
A 15-point peace accord signed on 11 March 1970 between the Iraqi Ba’athist government and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. It recognised Kurdish nationality, language, and autonomy within Iraq. It was the most comprehensive recognition of Kurdish rights in Iraqi history, but was systematically undermined by Baghdad and never fully implemented.
Why did the agreement fail?
The Ba’athists used the four-year implementation period to consolidate power rather than deliver autonomy. They gerrymandered Kirkuk’s boundaries, launched Arabisation campaigns, postponed the census, and attempted to assassinate Barzani’s son. In March 1974, Saddam imposed a watered-down autonomy that excluded Kirkuk, triggering the Second Iraqi-Kurdish War.
What role did the US play?
The US and Iran covertly supported Barzani’s Kurdish revolt to destabilise Iraq, not out of commitment to Kurdish self-determination. When Iraq and Iran settled their disputes in the 1975 Algiers Agreement, the US immediately abandoned the Kurds, allowing Iraq to launch a devastating military campaign against Kurdish resistance.
References and Further Reading
McDowall, D., A Modern History of the Kurds, I.B. Tauris, 2004.
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