The Oil-for-Food Programme used supervised Iraqi oil sales to finance civilian supplies under sanctions. Its separate northern account supported Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah through UN implementation. Understanding the programme requires separating the 1995 resolution, the 1996 agreement, later revenue rules and the November 2003 handover.

Erbil Citadel rising above a green slope, with cars and pedestrians on the street below
Erbil on 3 May 2018, photographed by Sarbast.T.Hameed, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. Erbil was one of the three northern governorates covered by the programme; this later city view provides geographical context. © Sarbast.T.Hameed · Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0.

From resolution to food deliveries

Security Council Resolution 986 was adopted on 14 April 1995. The UN–Iraq memorandum followed on 20 May 1996; implementation began that December and imported food first arrived in March 1997. Initially Iraq could sell $2 billion of oil every six months. The export ceiling was removed in December 1999. These distinct stages are set out in the September 2003 FAO/WFP assessment. [1] The programme’s financing came from Iraqi oil proceeds, with revenues held in a UN-controlled escrow account. [2]

What the northern account meant

Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah were covered by the northern arrangement. FAO/WFP distinguishes UN implementation there from Ministry of Trade distribution in the centre and south. [1] The 13% account therefore financed a humanitarian operation with its own administrative arrangements. It was not a direct, unrestricted treasury payment to the Kurdistan Regional Government. GAO also records that Baghdad negotiated food and medical contracts for the north, so “bypassing Baghdad entirely” misrepresents the procurement system. [2]

Revenue percentages changed over time

A British parliamentary answer on 16 December 2002 describes 59% for central and southern humanitarian needs, 13% for the north, 25% for compensation and 3% for UN administration. [3] That is a dated breakdown. The UN Compensation Commission explains that its share was initially 30%, falling to 25% in December 2000 and to 5% in May 2003. [4] Applying the later 59/13/25/3 formula unchanged to the programme’s whole history obscures those decisions.

Food access and its limits

The 2003 FAO/WFP mission associated improved northern child nutrition with better rations, supplementary feeding, health, water, sanitation and education services. It also described persistent dependence on rations and problems facing local agricultural markets. [1] Relief helped households and public services while leaving questions about livelihoods and long-term food security. Its contribution can be described without claiming that a single percentage caused every subsequent political or economic development.

Money, contracts and oversight

GAO’s June 2004 testimony reports more than $67 billion in programme oil sales during 1997–2002, alongside $38 billion in letters of credit. [2] Sales revenue, approved commitments and delivered assistance are different measures. The same review identified weaknesses in contract scrutiny, monitoring and procurement, and explained that GAO lacked full access to internal UN audits. [2] This dated investigation supports a critical account of administration; its estimates and open questions should retain their stated scope.

The 2003 handover

The invasion in March 2003 did not itself mark the programme’s administrative closure. The UN’s 19 November announcement scheduled termination for midnight on 21 November 2003, with operational responsibility, projects and supplier contracts transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority. It also described transfers of unencumbered funds to the Development Fund for Iraq. [5] This humanitarian funding arrangement is an important part of Kurdish regional history. Treating its 13% account as automatic diplomatic recognition or as the constitutional budget formula goes beyond what these documents establish.

Sources and further reading

  1. FAO/WFP, Crop, Food Supply and Nutrition Assessment Mission to Iraq, 23 September 2003; sections 4.1, 6.3, 8.2 and conclusions.
  2. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-04-880T, United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq’s Food Security, 16 June 2004; accessible testimony and methodology.
  3. House of Commons, “Oil Revenues”, written answer by Mike O’Brien, 16 December 2002, vol.396, columns552–553W.
  4. United Nations Compensation Commission, “The Compensation Fund”; changing percentages under Security Council resolutions705,986,1330 and1483.
  5. UN Office of the Iraq Programme, “Oil-for-Food Programme Set to Close 21 November”, press release, 19 November 2003.